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This paper surveys the literature on payout policy.  We start with a description of the Miller-
Modigliani payout irrelevance proposition, and then consider the effect of relaxing the 
assumptions on which it is based. We consider the role of taxes, asymmetric information, 
incomplete contracting possibilities, and transaction costs. The accumulated evidence indicates 
that changes in payout policies are not motivated by firms￿ desire to signal their true worth to the 
market. Both dividends and repurchases seem to be paid to reduce potential overinvestment by 
management. We also review the issue of the form of payout and the increased tendency to use 
open market share repurchases. Evidence suggests that the rise in the popularity of repurchases 
increased overall payout and increased firms￿ financial flexibility.  
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1.  Introduction 
How much cash should firms give back to their shareholders? And what form should 
payment take? Should corporations pay their shareholders through dividends or by repurchasing 
their shares, which is the least costly form of payout from a tax perspective? Firms must make 
these important decisions over and over again (some must be repeated and some need to be 
reevaluated each period), on a regular basis.  
Because these decisions are dynamic they are labeled as payout policy. The word 
￿policy￿ implies some consistency over time, and that payouts, and dividends in particular, do 
not simply evolve in an arbitrary and random manner. Much of the literature in the past forty 
years has attempted to find and explain the pattern in payout policies of corporations.  
The money involved in these payout decisions is substantial. For example, in 1999 
corporations spent more than $350b on dividends and repurchases and over $400b on liquidating 
dividends in the form of cash spent on mergers and acquisitions.
1 
Payout policy is important not only because of the amount of money involved and the 
repeated nature of the decision, but also because payout policy is closely related to, and interacts 
with, most of the financial and investment decisions firms make. Management and the board of 
directors must decide the level of dividends, what repurchases to make (and the mirror image 
decision of equity issuance), the amount of financial slack the firm carries (which may be a non-
trivial amount; for example, at the end of 1999, Microsoft held over $17b in financial slack), 
investment in real assets, mergers and acquisitions, and debt issuance. Since capital markets are 
neither perfect nor complete, all of these decisions interact with one another.  
Understanding payout policy may also help us to better understand the other pieces in this 
                                                 
1 Data on dividend and repurchases are from CRSP and Compustat. Data on cash M&A activity (for U.S. firms as 
acquirers only) is from SDC.  
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puzzle. Theories of capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, asset pricing, and capital 
budgeting all rely on a view of how and why firms pay out cash.  
Six empirical observations play an important role in discussions of payout policies:   
1.  Large, established corporations typically pay out a significant percentage of their 
earnings in the form of dividends and repurchases.   
2.  Historically, dividends have been the predominant form of payout. Share 
repurchases were relatively unimportant until the mid-1980s, but since then have 
become an important form of payment.  
3.  Among firms traded on organized exchanges in the U.S., the proportion of 
dividend-paying firms has been steadily declining.  Since the beginning of the 
1980s, most firms have initiated their cash payment to shareholders in the form of 
repurchases rather than dividends.  
4.  Individuals in high tax brackets receive large amounts in cash dividends and pay 
substantial amounts of taxes on these dividends.  
5.  Corporations smooth dividends relative to earnings. Repurchases are more 
volatile than dividends. 
6.  The market reacts positively to announcements of repurchase and dividend 
increases, and negatively to announcements of dividend decreases. 
The challenge to financial economists has been to develop a payout policy framework 
where firms maximize shareholders￿ wealth and investors maximize utility.  In such a framework 
payout policy would function in a way that is consistent with these observations and is not 
rejected by empirical tests.    
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The seminal contribution to research on dividend policy is that of Miller and Modigliani 
(1961).  Prior to their paper, most economists believed hat the more dividends a firm paid, the 
more valuable the firm would be.  This view was derived from an extension of the discounted 
dividends approach to firm valuation, which says that the value V0 of the firm at date 0, if the 
first dividends are paid one period from now at date 1, is given by the formula: 
               
) r   +   (1






     (1) 
where 
Dt = the dividends paid by the firm at the end of period t 
rt = the investors’ opportunity cost of capital for period t 
Gordon (1959) argued that investors￿ required rate of return rt would increase with retention of 
earnings and increased investment.  Although the future dividend stream would presumably be 
larger as a result of the increase in investment (i.e., Dt would grow faster), Gordon felt that 
higher rt would overshadow this effect. The reason for the increase in rt would be the greater 
uncertainty associated with the increased investment relative to the safety of the dividend. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) pointed out that this view of dividend policy incomplete 
and they developed a rigorous framework for analyzing payout policy. They show that what 
really counts is the firm￿s investment policy. As long as investment policy doesn￿t change, 
altering the mix of retained earnings and payout will not affect firm￿s value. The Miller and 
Modigliani framework has formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and payout 
policy in general. It is important to note that their framework is rich enough to encompass both 
dividends and repurchases, as the only determinant of a firm￿s value is its investment policy.   
The payout literature that followed the Miller and Modigliani article attempted to 
reconcile the indisputable logic of their dividend irrelevance theorem with the notion that both  
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managers and markets care about payouts, and dividends in particular. The theoretical work on 
this issue suggests five possible imperfections that management should consider when it 
determines dividend policy:  
 (i)  Taxes  If dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, and investors cannot 
use dynamic trading strategies to avoid this higher taxation,  then minimizing 
dividends is optimal. 
(ii)  Asymmetric Information  If managers know more about the true worth of their 
firm, dividends can be used to convey that information to the market, despite the 
costs associated with paying those dividends. (However, we note that with 
asymmetric information, dividends can also be viewed as bad news.  Firms that 
pay dividends are the ones that have no positive NPV projects in which to invest.) 
(iii)  Incomplete Contracts  If contracts are incomplete or are not fully enforceable, 
equityholders may, under some circumstances, use dividends to discipline 
managers or to expropriate wealth from debtholders. 
(iv)  Institutional Constraints.  If various institutions avoid investing in non- or low-
dividend-paying stocks because of legal restrictions, management  may find that it 
is optimal to pay dividends despite the tax burden it imposes on individual 
investors. 
(v)  Transaction Costs.  If dividend payments minimize transaction costs to 
equityholders (either direct transaction costs or the effort of self control), then 
positive dividend payout may be optimal.  
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In section 2 we elaborate further on some of the empirical observations about corporate 
payout policies. Section 3 reviews the Miller and Modigliani analysis.  Subsequent sections 
recount the literature that has relaxed their assumptions in various ways. 
 
2.  Some Empirical Observations on Payout Policies 
In the previous section we state six important empirical findings about corporate payout policies. 
Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the first observation that corporations pay out a substantial portion 
of their earnings.  Table 1 shows that for U.S. industrial firms, dollar expenditures on both 
dividends and repurchases have increased over the years.
   
  The table also illustrates the second empirical observation above.  It shows that dividends 
have been the dominant form of payout in the early period, but that repurchases have become 
more and more important through the years. For example, during the 1970s the average dividend 
payout was 38% and the average repurchase payout was 3%. By the 1990s the average dividend 
payout was 58% and the average repurchase payout was 27%. From these numbers it appears 
U.S. corporations paid out over 80% of their earnings to shareholders.2 Clearly, payments to 
shareholders through dividends and repurchases represent a significant portion of corporate 
earnings. However, we note that these numbers are tilted towards large firms since we calculate 
payout as: (Σ Div/Σ Earnings). In addition, aggregate earnings (i.e., the denominator) contain 
many negative earnings. This is especially true in the later period, when more and more small, 
not yet profitable, firms registered on Nasdaq. When we calculate payout for each firm and then 
average across firms (equal weighted) the overall payout relative to earnings is around 25%. 
(Grullon and Michaely, 2002, Figure 1). 
                                                 
2 See also Dunsby (1993) and Allen and Michaely (1995).  
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To further illustrate the second observation, Figure 1 shows the evolution of dividend 
yield (total dividends over market value of equity), repurchase yield (repurchases over market 
value of equity) and payout yield (dividends plus repurchases over market value of equity) since 
the early 1970s. Whether we examine repurchases relative to earnings or to the market value of 
the firm, it is clear that repurchases as a payout method were not a factor until the mid-1980s. It 
is interesting that in the 1990s, firms￿ average total yield remained more or less constant while 
the dividend yield declined and the repurchase yield increased.  
The third observation is that dividends are now being paid by fewer firms.  As we can see 
in Figure 2, Fama and French (2001) show that the proportion of firms that pay dividends 
(among all CRSP listed firms) has fallen dramatically over the years, regardless of their earnings 
level.  Prior to the 1980￿s firms that initiated a cash payment usually did so with dividends. But 
since the beginning of the 1980s, most firms have initiated cash payments with repurchases. 
Figure 3 documents this observation for U.S. industrial firms. We define a cash distribution 
initiation as the first time after 1972 that a firm pays dividends and/or repurchases shares. Figure 
3 shows that the proportion of firms that initiated a cash distribution by using only share 
repurchases increased from less than 27% in 1974 to more than 81% in 1998. Share repurchase 
programs have now become the preferred method of payout among firms initiating cash 
distributions to their equityholders. (For earlier evidence on trend in repurchases see Bagwell and 
Shoven, 1989) 
The fourth observation is that individuals pay substantial taxes on the large amounts of 
dividends that they receive. We collected information from the Federal Reserve￿s Flow of Funds 
Accounts for the United States, and from the IRS, SOI Bulletin about total dividends paid and 
the amounts received by individuals and corporations for the years 1973-1996. Table 2 presents  
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the results. In most of the years in our sample (1973-1996) individuals received more than 50% 
of the dividends paid out by corporations. Moreover, most of these dividends were received by 
individuals in high tax brackets (those with annual gross income over $50,000).  
Peterson, Peterson, and Ang (1985) conducted a study of the tax returns of individuals in 
1979. More than $33b of dividends were included in individuals￿ gross income that year. The 
total of dividends paid out by corporations in 1979 was $57.7b, so individuals received over two-
thirds of that total.  The average marginal tax rate on these dividends received by individuals 
(weighted by dividends received) was 40%.  
The fact that individuals pay considerable taxes on dividends has been particularly 
important in the dividend debate, because there appears to be a substantial tax disadvantage to 
dividends compared to repurchases. Dividends are taxed as ordinary income. Share repurchases 
are taxed on a capital gains basis.  Since the tax rate on capital gains has usually been lower than 
the tax rate on ordinary income, investors had an advantage if firms repurchased, rather than paid 
dividends.  Even after the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) when the tax rates on ordinary income 
and capital gains were equal for several years, there was a tax disadvantage to dividends because 
capital gains were only taxed on realization.  In the 2001 tax code, long-term capital gains are 
lower than ordinary income for most individual investors. For example, an investor in the highest 
marginal tax bracket pays 39.6% taxes on dividends and only 20% tax on long-term capital 
gains. Black (1976) calls the fact that corporations pay such large amounts of dividends despite 
the existence of another, relatively untaxed, payout method, the "dividend puzzle."  
The fifth observation is that corporations smooth dividends. From Table 1, we can see 
that during the entire 1972-1998 period, aggregate dividends fell only twice (in 1992 and in 
1998), and then only by very small amounts. On the other hand, aggregate earnings fell five  
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times during the same time period and the drop was larger. Unlike dividends, repurchases are 
more volatile and more sensitive to economic conditions. During the recession in the early 
1970s, firms cut repurchases. They did this again during the recession of the early 1990s. 
Overall, between 1972 and ￿1998, aggregate repurchases fell seven times. 
Firms usually increase dividends gradually and rarely cut them.  Table 3 shows the 
number of dividend increases and decreases for over 13,000 publicly held issues, for the years 
1971 to 2001 (Moody￿s dividend records, 1999 and S&P￿s dividend book, 2001). In each year, 
the number of dividend cuts is much smaller than the number of dividend increases.  For 
example, in 1999, there were 1,763 dividend increases or initiations, but only 121 cuts or 
omissions. 
In a classic study, Lintner (1956) showed that dividend-smoothing behavior was 
widespread.  He started with over 600 listed companies and selected 28 to survey and interview.  
Linter did not select these companies as a statistically representative sample, but chose them to 
encompass a wide range of different situations.   
Lintner made a number of important observations concerning the dividend policies of 
these firms.  The first is that firms are primarily concerned with the stability of dividends.  Firms 
do not set dividends de novo each quarter.  Instead, they first consider whether they need to 
make any changes from the existing rate. Only when they have decided a change is necessary do 
they consider how large it should be.  Managers appear to believe strongly that the market puts a 
premium on firms with a stable dividend policy. 
Second, Lintner observed that earnings were the most important determinant of any 
change in dividends.  Management needed to explain to shareholders the reasons for its actions, 
and needed to base its explanations on simple and observable indicators.  The level of earnings  
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was  the most important of these.  Most companies appeared to have a target payout ratio; if 
there was a sudden unexpected increase in earnings, firms adjusted their dividends slowly. Firms 
were very reluctant to cut dividends.   
Based on interviews of the 28 firms￿ management teams, Lintner reported a median target 
payout ratio of 50%. Despite the very small sample and the fact that the study was conducted 
nearly half a century ago, the target payout ratio is not far from what we present in table 1 for all 
U.S. industrial firms over a much longer time period.  
Lintner’s third finding was that management set dividend policy first.  Other policies 
were then adjusted, taking dividend policy as given.  For example, if investment opportunities 
were abundant and the firm had insufficient internal funds, it would resort to outside funds. 
Lintner suggested that the following model captured the most important elements of 
firms’ dividend policies.  For firm i, 
 D*it = α iEit,       ( 2 )  
 D t - Dt-1 = ai + ci(D*it - Di(t-1)) + uit,     (3) 
where for firm i 
D*it  = desired dividend payment during period t 
Dit  = actual dividend payment during period t 
α i  = target payout ratio 
Eit  = earnings of the firm during period t 
ai  = a constant relating to dividend growth 
ci  = partial adjustment factor 
uit  = error term 
This model was able to explain 85% of the dividend changes in his sample of companies.    
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Fama and Babiak (1968) undertook a comprehensive study of the Lintner model’s 
performance, using data for 392 major industrial firms over the period 1946 through 1964.  They 
also found the Lintner model performed well.  Over the years, other studies have confirmed this. 
The sixth observation is that the market usually reacts positively to announcements of 
increases in payouts and negatively to announcements of dividend decreases.  This phenomenon 
has been documented by many studies, such as Pettit (1972), Charest (1978), Aharony and 
Swary (1980), and Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) for dividends, and by Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) for repurchases.  This evidence is consistent with managers 
knowing more than outside shareholders, and dividends and repurchases changes provide some 
information on future cash flows (e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979, or Miller and Rock, 1985), or about 
the cost of capital (Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002, Grullon and Michaely 2000).  
The evidence is also consistent with the notion that when contracts are incomplete,  higher 
payouts can sometimes be used to align management￿s interest with that of shareholders￿, as 
suggested by Grossman and Hart (1982), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986). 
 
3.  The Miller-Modigliani Dividend Irrelevance Proposition 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) showed that in perfect and complete capital markets, a 
firm’s dividend policy does not affect its value.  The basic premise of their argument is that firm 
value is determined by choosing optimal investments.  The net payout is the difference between 
earnings and investment, and is simply a residual.  Because the net payout comprises dividends 
and share issues/repurchases, a firm can adjust its dividends to any level with an offsetting 
change in shares outstanding.  From the perspective of investors, dividend policy is irrelevant,  
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because any desired stream of payments can be replicated by appropriate purchases and sales of 
equity.  Thus, investors will not pay a premium for any particular dividend policy.        
To illustrate the argument behind the theorem, suppose there are perfect and complete 
capital markets (with no taxes).  At date t, the value of the firm is 
Vt = present value of payouts  
where payouts include dividends and repurchases.  For ease of exposition, we initially consider 
the case with two periods, t and t + 1.  At date t, a firm has  
- earnings,  Et, (earned previously) on hand.   
It must decide on  
-  the level of investment, It 
-  the level of dividends, Dt 
-  the amount of shares to be issued, ∆ St (or repurchased if ∆ St is negative) 
The level of earnings at t + 1, denoted Et+1(It, θ t+1), depends on the level of investment It and a 
random variable θ t+1.  Since t + 1 is the final date, all earnings are paid out at t + 1.  Given 
complete markets, let 
  p t(θ t+1) = time t price of consumption in state θ t+1 
Then it follows that  
Vt = Dt - ∆ St + ∫pt(θ t+1)Et+1(It, θ t+1)dθ t+1      ( 4 )  
The sources and uses of funds identity says that in the current period t: 
Et + ∆ St  =  It + Dt          (5) 
Using this to substitute for current payouts, Dt - ∆ St, gives 
Vt = Et - It + ∫pt(θ t+1)Et+1(It, θ t+1)dθ t+1     ( 6 )   
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From equation (6) we can immediately see the first insight from Miller and Modigliani’s 
analysis. .  Since Et is given, the only determinant of the value of the firm is current investment 
It. 
This analysis can be extended to the case with more than two periods.  Now  
Vt = Et - It + Vt+1         ( 7 )  
where 
Vt+1 = Et+1(It, θ t+1) - It+1 + Vt+2      ( 8 )  
and so on, recursively.  It follows from this extension that it is only the sequence of investments 
It, It+1, ... that is important in determining firm value.  Firm value is maximized by making an 
appropriate choice of investment policy. 
The second insight from the Miller-Modigliani analysis concerns the firm’s dividend 
policy, which involves setting the value of Dt each period.  Given that investment is chosen to 
maximize firm value, the firm’s payout in period t, Dt - ∆ St, must be equal to the difference 
between earnings and investment, Et - It.  However, the level of dividends, Dt, can take any 
value, since the level of share issuance, ∆ St, can always be set to offset this.  It follows that 
dividend policy does not affect firm value at all. It is only investment policy that matters. 
The analysis above implicitly assumes 100% equity financing.  It can be extended to 
include debt financing.  In this case management can finance dividends by using both debt and 
equity issues.  This added degree of freedom does not affect the result.  As with equity-financed 
dividends, no additional value is created by debt-financed dividends, since capital markets are 
perfect and complete so the amount of debt does not affect the total value of the firm.    
The third and perhaps most important insight of Miller and Modigliani’s analysis is that it 
identifies the situations in which dividend policy can affect firm value.  It could matter, not  
 15 
because dividends are "safer" than capital gains, as was traditionally argued, but because one of 
the assumptions underlying the result is violated.   
Perfect and complete capital markets have the following elements: 
1. No  taxes 
2. Symmetric  information 
3.    Complete contracting possibilities 
4.  No transaction costs 
5. Complete  markets 
It is easy to see the role played by each of the above assumptions.  The reason for 
Assumption 1 is clear.  In the no-taxes case, it is irrelevant whether a firm pays out dividends or 
repurchases shares; what is important is Dt - ∆ St.  If dividends and share repurchases are taxed 
differently, this is no longer the case.  Suppose, for example, dividends are taxed at a higher rate 
than capital gains from share repurchases.  Then it is optimal not to pay dividends, but instead to 
pay out any residual funds by repurchasing shares.  In section 5 we discuss the issues raised by 
relaxing Assumption 1.    
Assumption 2 is that all participants (including the firms) have exactly the same 
information set.  In practice, this is rarely the case.  Managers are insiders and are likely to know 
more about the current and future prospects of the firm than outsiders.  Dividends can reveal 
some information to outsiders about the value of the corporation.  Moreover, insiders might even 
use dividends to deliberately change the market’s perception about the firm’s value.  Again, 
dividend policy can affect firm value.  Sections 6.1 and 7.1 consider the effect of asymmetric 
information.  
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The complete contracting possibilities specified in Assumption 3 mean that there is no 
agency problem between managers and security holders, for example.  In this case, motivating 
the decisions of managers is possible through the use of enforceable contracts.  Without 
complete contracting possibilities, dividend policy could, for example, help ensure that managers 
act in the interest of shareholders.  A high payout ratio cause management to be more disciplined 
in the use of the firm’s resources and consequently increase firm value.  We cover these issues in 
sections 6.2 and 7.2. 
Assumption 4 concerns transaction costs.  These come in a variety of forms.  For 
example, firms can distribute cash through dividends and raise capital through equity issues.  If 
flotation costs are significant, then every trip to the capital market will reduce the firm’s value.  
This means changing dividend policy can change the value of the firm. By the same token, when 
investors sell securities and make decisions about such sales, the transaction costs that investors 
incur can also result in dividend policy affecting the value of the firm.  Section 8 develops 
several transaction-cost-related theories of dividend policy. 
Assumption 5 is that markets are complete.  To illustrate why this is important, assume 
that because trading opportunities are limited, there are two groups with different marginal rates 
of substitution between current and future consumption.  By adjusting its dividend policy, a firm 
might be able to increase its value by appealing to one of these groups.  The literature has paid 
very little attention to explanations such as these for dividend policy. Nevertheless, these 
explanations could be important if some investors wish to buy stocks with a steady income 
stream, and markets are incomplete because of high transaction costs. Further analysis in this 
area might provide some insights into dividend policy.   
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Another issue that is central to our survey is the form of the payout. One area of 
significant growth in the literature is related to the role of repurchases as a form of payout, not 
only because repurchases have become more popular (Table 1), but also because of the research 
concerning the reasons for repurchases and the interrelation between dividends and repurchases. 
In section 4 we define corporate payout, both conceptually and empirically. In section 9 we 
review in detail the recent developments concerning repurchases. 
 
4.  How Should We Measure Payout? 
  The Miller and Modigliani framework defines payout policy as the net payout to 
shareholders. However, most empirical work measures payout only by the amount of dividends 
the firms pay. Such studies do  not consider repurchases.  Neither do they factor in either net 
payout (accounting for capital raising activities) or cash spent on mergers and acquisitions. 
  If we wish to find out how much cash corporations pay out (relative to their earnings) at 
the aggregate level, we need to consider some of the aggregate measures, such as the one 
presented in Table 1, namely, aggregate dividends plus aggregate repurchases relative to 
aggregate earnings. But even this measure is incomplete. First, shareholders also receive cash 
payouts from corporations through mergers and acquisitions that are accomplished through cash 
transactions. That is, shareholders of the acquired firms receive a cash payment that can be 
viewed as a liquidating (or final) dividend.  
  Using data from SDC, Table 4 presents the magnitude of such payments. For each year 
we calculate the total dollar amount that was paid to U.S. corporations in all cash M&A deals. 
(Note that this figure is a lower bound, since it does not account for deals in which payment was 
partially in cash and partially in stocks.) The amount is not trivial and it does vary by year. This  
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type of liquidating dividend seems to have a significant weight in the aggregate payout of U.S. 
corporations. For example, in 1999, proceeds from cash M&As were more than the combined 
cash distributed to shareholders through dividends and repurchases combined. 
  Our next measure accounts not only for the outflow of funds from corporations to their 
shareholders, but also for the inflow of funds. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 present the dollar 
amount of capital raised by U.S. corporations through SEOs and IPOs. Column 5 reports the net 
amount (cash from M&As minus proceeds from IPOs and SEOs). It is clear that these are 
significant amounts. When we compare Tables 1 and 4, we see that in the last decade these 
amounts are as large as the cash payments through dividends and repurchases combined. We are 
also interested to see its impact on the overall aggregate payout. Clearly, in some years the 
aggregate payout is higher than after-tax earnings. 
  One can also define the aggregate payout as the total transfer of cash from the corporate 
sector to the private sector. This definition contains three elements: dividends paid to individual 
investors, repurchase of shares from individual investors, and net cash M&A activity where the 
proceeds are going to the private sector. 
  Using this definition and information from the IRS Statistics of Income and the Federal 
Reserve Flow of Funds publications, we can recalculate a rough measure of the total payout to 
the private sector over the years. We base this measure on the total dividends, repurchases, and 
cash M&A activity. We assume that the proportional holdings of each group (individuals, 
corporations and institutions) is the same for all firms in the economy.  
  In Table 2, we calculate the portion of shares held by individual investors (using 
information from Table L-312 from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds).
3 Using this ratio, we 
                                                 
3 Total dividends are taken from Table F-7 (distribution of national income) of the Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
U.S. The portion of dividends received by individuals is from Table 1 of the SOI Bulletin, Winter 1999-2000.  
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can approximate the portion of repurchased shares and net cash M&As that went to the private 
sector. For example, in 1995, the private sector received $94b in dividends (see Table 2), $82b in 
cash M&As (57.9% of shares owned by individuals multiplied by $143b of net cash M&As, see 
Tables 2 and 4), and roughly $50b in repurchases (57.9% of shares owned by individuals 
multiplied by $72.3b of repurchases; see Tables 1 and 2). We note that out of total cash 
payments to the private sector of around $219b, less than half is through ￿formal￿ dividends. 
Table 5 presents the cash payout that goes to the private sector (dividends, repurchases, and net 
cash M&As) for the various years.  
  These issues have not received much attention in the literature. We believe they should.  
It is difficult to take a position on payout policy before we correctly measure it.  
  An equally interesting issue is to analyze the payout, its components, and the relation 
between payout and earnings at the firm level. For example, we think it would be interesting to 
investigate the type of firm that gives its shareholders liquidating dividends, and how such 
dividends relate to other types of payout. Analyzing the interaction between total payout, 
dividends, and the recent surge in repurchases would also require information on individual 
firms￿ payout policies. But at the firm level, there may be another problem in the definition of 
payout relative to earnings, since a significant portion of firms have negative earnings. For these 
firms, it is not possible to define a total payout ratio, a repurchase payout ratio, or a dividend 
payout ratio.  
  Our discussion highlights several important points. First, in our opinion, the main issue is 
not whether one measure is better than another. Instead, we ask, what is the question that we are 
trying to answer? This question in turn should have an impact on which definition of payout we 
use.   
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  The issue of how to define payout is also very relevant to the excess volatility literature. 
For example, Ackert and Smith (1993) showed that the results of variance-bound tests depend on 
how we measure cash distributions to shareholders. When they used only stated dividends, they 
found evidence of excess volatility. When the payout measure included share repurchase and 
takeover distributions as well, they did not find evidence of excess volatility. It is likely that 
using the net total payout to investors will add some variability to cash flows. It may also reduce 
even further the discrepancy between cash flow volatility and price volatility. In our opinion, this 
issue is worthy of further research. 
  Second, it is clear that most of the finance literature has analyzed the payout policy 
question using only the very narrow definition of dividend payout. Some studies have attempted 
to analyze repurchase payout. But with only a few exceptions, the literature does not cover the 
issue of total payout, its composition, and determination. This lacuna is understandable, given 
the fact that over many years, dividends were the most prominent form of payout. But this is not 
so anymore. Thus, to a great extent our review article reflects the current literature. We devote 
more space and put more emphasis on dividends relative to the other forms of payouts. We hope 
future research will explore the other aspects of payout policy and their implications. 
 
5.  Taxes 
Much of the literature on payout policy focuses on the importance of taxes, and tries to 
reconcile several of the empirical observations discussed in our introduction.  Firms pay out a 
large part of their earnings as dividends; many of the recipients are in high tax brackets.  Firms 
did not traditionally use repurchases as a method of payout.  The basic aim of the tax-related  
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literature on dividends has been to investigate whether there is a tax effect:  All else equal, we 
ask if firms that pay out high dividends are less valuable than firms that pay out low dividends. 
Two basic ideas are important to understanding how to interpret the results of these 
investigations: 
1.  Static clientele models: 
(i)  Different groups, or "clienteles," are taxed differently. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) argued that firms have an incentive to supply stocks 
that minimize the taxes of each clientele.  In equilibrium, no further 
possibilities for reducing taxes will exist and all firms will be equally 
priced. 
(ii)  A particular case (labeled as the simple static model) is when all investors 
are taxed the same way, and capital gains are taxed less than dividend 
income.  In this case, the optimal policy is not to pay dividends.  Firms 
with high dividend yields would be worth less than equivalent firms with 
low dividend yields. 
2.  Dynamic clientele model:  If investors can trade through time, tax liabilities can 
be reduced even further.  The dividend-paying stock will end up (just before the 
ex-dividend day) in the hands of those who are taxed the least when the dividend 
is received.  Such trades will be reversed directly after the ex-day. 
The empirical studies of dividend policy have tried to distinguish between the different 
versions of these models by attempting to identify one or more of the following: 
(i)  Is there a tax effect so that low-dividend-paying stocks are more valuable than 
high dividend stocks?  
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(ii)  Do static tax clienteles exist so that the marginal tax rates of high-dividend 
stockholders are lower than those of low-dividend stockholders? 
(iii)  Do dynamic tax clienteles exist so that there is a large volume around the ex-
dividend day, and low-tax-rate investors actually receive the dividend?   
This literature has traditionally been divided into CAPM-based studies and ex-dividend 
day studies. In our view, more insight is gained by comparing static to dynamic models.  In the 
static models, investors trade only once. Thus, with the objective of minimizing taxes (keeping 
all else constant), investors must make a long-term decision about their holdings. The buy-and-
hold CAPM studies, such as Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), and Miller and Scholes 
(1982), fall into this category.  The Elton and Gruber (1970) study is similar in that respect. 
Investors are allowed to trade only once, either on the cum-day or on the ex-day, but not on both.  
As we shall show, a static view is appropriate when transaction costs are exceedingly high, or 
when tax payments have been reduced to zero in the static clientele model.   
In contrast, in dynamic models, investors are allowed to take different positions at 
different times. These models take into account risk, taxes, and transaction costs. Just before the 
ex-day, dividend-paying stocks can flow temporarily to the investors who value them the most.  
 
5.1  Static models 
First, we look at the special case in which all investors are taxed in the same way and the 
tax rate on dividend income is higher than the tax rate on capital gains income. In otherwise 
perfect capital markets, the optimal policy is to pay no dividends.  Equityholders are better off 
receiving profits through repurchases or selling their shares so that they pay capital gains taxes 
rather than the higher taxes on dividends. Most U.S. corporations have not followed this  
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scenario. For a long time, many firms have paid dividends regularly and have rarely repurchased 
their shares. On the face of it, this behavior is puzzling, especially if we believe that agents in the 
market place behave in a rational manner.  The basic assumption of this simple static model is 
that for all investors there is a substantial tax disadvantage to dividends because they are taxed 
(heavily) as ordinary income, while share repurchases are taxed (lightly) as capital gains.   
But even if the statutory tax rates on dividends and capital gains were equal (and usually, 
they have not been), from a tax perspective receiving unrealized capital gains is superior to 
dividend payments.  
The first reason is that capital gains do not have to be realized immediately, and thus the 
associated tax can be postponed. An investor￿s ability to postpone may generate considerable 
value. Imagine a stock with an expected annual return of 15%, and an investor with a marginal 
tax rate of 20% on long-term capital gains. Say the investor has $1000 and an investment horizon 
of ten years, and consider whether she should realize gains at the end of each year or wait and 
realize all gains at the end of the tenth year. Under the first strategy, her final wealth would be 
$3,106. Under the second strategy it would be $3,436, a substantial difference. 
 Second, investors can choose when to realize capital gains (unlike dividends, for which 
they have no choice in the timing). In a more formal setting, Constantinides (1984) showed that 
investors should be willing to pay for this option to delay capital gains realization, and labeled it 
the ￿tax timing option.￿ 
In reality, of course, not all investors are taxed as individuals.  Many financial 
institutions, such as pension funds and endowments, do not pay taxes.  They have no reason to 
prefer capital gains to dividends, or vice versa. Individuals hold stocks directly or indirectly, and 
so do corporations.  One of the principal reasons corporations hold dividend-paying stocks as  
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both a form of near-cash assets and as an investment is because under the U.S. tax code, a large 
fraction of intercorporate dividends are exempt from taxation, but intercorporate (or government) 
interest payments are not.  Under the old tax code, only 15% of dividends, deemed taxable 
income, were taxed, so the effective tax rate on dividends received was 0.15 x 0.46 (marginal 
corporate tax rate) = 6.9%.  But corporations had to pay the full amount of taxes on any realized 
gains.  Under the current tax code, 30% of dividends are taxed.
4  
In a clientele model, taxpayers in different groups hold different types of assets, as 
illustrated in the stylized example below.  Individuals hold low-dividend-payout stocks. 
Medium-dividend-payout firms are owned by people who can avoid taxes, or by tax-free 
institutions.  Corporations own high-dividend-payout stocks.  Firms must be indifferent between 
the three types of stock, or they would increase their value by issuing more of the type that they 
prefer.   
How are assets priced in this model?  Since firms must be indifferent between the 
different types of assets, the assets must be priced so they are equally desirable.  To show how 
this works, we use the following example: 
Suppose there are three groups that hold stocks: 
                                                 
 
4 Prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA), individual investors who held a stock for at least six months paid a lower 
tax on capital gains (20%) than on ordinary dividends (50%).  The TRA eliminated all distinctions between capital 
gains and ordinary income.  However, it is still possible to defer taxes on capital gains by not realizing the gains.  
Before the 1986 TRA, a corporation that held the stock of another corporation paid taxes on only 15% of the 
dividend.  Therefore, the effective tax rate for dividend income was 0.15 x 0.46 = 0.069.  After the TRA, the 
corporation income tax rate was reduced to 34%.  The fraction of the dividend exempted from taxes was also 
reduced to 70%.  The effective tax rate for dividend income was therefore increased to 0.3 x 0.34 = 0.102.  In both 
time periods, the dividend exemption could be as high as 100% if the dividend-paying corporation was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the dividend-receiving corporation.  
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(i)  Individuals who are in high tax brackets and pay high taxes on dividend-paying 
stocks. These investors are subject to a 50% tax rate on dividend income and a 
20% tax rate on capital gains. 
(ii)  Corporations whose tax situation is such that they pay low taxes on stocks that 
pay dividends. Their tax rate on dividend income is 10% and is 35% on capital 
gains. 
(iii)  Institutions that pay no taxes.  Their opportunity cost of capital, determined by the 
return available in investment other than securities, is 10%. 
Assume that these groups are risk neutral, so risk is not an issue. All that matters is the 
after-tax returns to the stocks. (We note that in this stylized market, a tax clientele is a result of 
both the risk neutrality assumption and the trading restrictions.) 
There are three types of stock.  For simplicity, we assume that each stock earnings per 
share of $100.  The only difference between these shares is the form of payout.  Table 6 
describes the after-tax cash flow for each group if they held each type of stock. 
In this example, individuals with high tax brackets will hold low-payout shares, 
corporations will hold the high-payout shares, and institutions will be prepared to hold all three.  
The asset holdings of these three groups are shown in Table 7. 
To show why the shares must all have the same price, if the price of low-payout shares 
was $1050 and the prices of the high- and medium-payout stocks was $1000, what would 
happen?  High- and medium-payout firms would have an incentive to change their dividend 
policies and increase the supply of low-payout stocks.  This change would put downward 
pressure on the price of low payout stock.  What amount of stock do investors demand?   
Individuals would still be prepared to buy the low-payout stock, since $80/$1050 = 7.62%,  
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which is greater than the 6.5% ($65/$1000) they would obtain from holding medium-payout 
stocks, or the 5% ($50/$1000) they would obtain from holding low-payout stocks.  What about 
institutions?  They￿ will not be prepared to hold low-payout stocks, since the return on them is 
$100/$1050 = 9.52%.  This return is less than the 10% ($100/$1000) they can get on the other 
two stocks and the opportunity cost they obtain from holding foreign assets, so they will try to 
sell.  Again, there is downward pressure on the price of low-payout stock. Therefore, the price 
must fall from $1050 to $1000 for equilibrium to be restored.  A similar argument explains why 
the prices of other stocks are also $1000.  Thus, in equilibrium, the price is independent of 
payout policy and dividend policy is irrelevant, as in the original Miller and Modigliani theory.
5 
Several studies have attempted to distinguish between the case of the static model in 
which everybody is taxed the same, and the static clientele model in which investors are taxed 
differently.  Perhaps the easiest way to make the distinction is to investigate the relation between 
the marginal tax rates of stockholders and the amount of dividends paid. 
Blume, Crockett, and Friend (1974) found some evidence from survey data that there is a 
modest (inverse) relation between investors￿ tax brackets and the dividend yield of the stocks 
they hold. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum (1978), using individual investor data 
supplied by a brokerage firm, found very little evidence of this type of effect. Both studies 
indicate that investors in high tax brackets hold substantial amounts of dividend-paying stock.   
Table 2 corroborates these findings for the last 30 years. It is evident that individuals in 
high tax brackets hold substantial amounts of dividend-paying stocks. There is no evidence that 
their dividend income relative to capital gains income is lower than that of investors in low tax 
                                                 
5 The equilibrium here is conceptually different from the one in Miller (1977). Miller presents an equilibrium in 
which there is a strict clientele. In the equilibrium  here, potential arbitrage by institutions ensures one price for all 
stocks, regardless of their dividend policy. The existence of a strict tax-clientele is inconsistent with no-arbitrage.  
See also Blume (1980).  
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brackets. According to the clientele theory, this phenomenon should not occur. For example, 
firms should be able to increase their value by switching from a policy of paying dividends to 
repurchasing shares.  
Elton and Gruber (1970) sought to identify the relation between marginal tax rates and 
dividend yield by using ex-dividend date price data.  They argued that when investors were about 
to sell a stock around its ex-dividend date, they would calculate whether they were better off 
selling just before it goes ex-dividend, or just after.  If they sold before the stock went ex-
dividend, they got a higher price. Their marginal tax liability was on the capital gain, represented 
by the difference between the two prices.  If they sold just after, the price would have fallen 
because the dividend had been paid.  They would receive the dividend plus this low price, and 
their marginal tax liability would be their personal tax rate times the dividend.  In this setting, we 
can make a direct comparison between the market valuation of after-tax dividend dollars and 
after-tax capital gains dollars. In equilibrium, stocks must be priced so that individuals￿ marginal 
tax liabilities are the same for both strategies.   




PB    =  stock price cum-dividend (the last day the stock is traded with the 
dividend) 
 
PA  =  expected stock price on the ex-dividend day (the first day the stock is 
traded without the dividend) 
 
P0  =  stock price at initial purchase 
 
D = dividend  amount 
 
() () () t - 1 D + P - P t - P = P - P t - P d 0 A g A 0 B g B     (9)  
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tg  =  personal tax rate on capital gains 
 
td  =  personal tax rate on dividends. 
 
 
The left-hand side of  (9) represents the after-tax receipts the seller would receive if he sold the 
stock cum-dividend and had bought it originally for P0.  The right-hand side represents the 
expected net receipts from sale on the ex-dividend day.  Rearranging, 







d A B       ( 1 0 )  
 
If there are clienteles with different tax brackets, the tax rates implied by the ratio of the price 
change to the dividend will differ for stocks with different levels of dividends.  The implied tax 
rate will be greater the higher the dividend yield, and, hence, the lower the tax bracket of 
investors.  Elton and Gruber find strong evidence of a clientele effect that is consistent with this 
relation. 
 
5.1.1 The role of risk 
In the simplest versions of the theories presented above, risk has been ignored.  In 
practice, because risk is likely to be of primary importance, it must be explicitly incorporated in 
the analysis. 
As Long (1977) pointed out, there is an implicit assumption in the argument of a tax 
clientele that when there is risk, there are redundant securities in the market.  An investor can 
achieve the desired portfolio allocation in risk characteristics without regard to dividend yield.  
In other words, investors can create several identical portfolios in all aspects but dividend yield.  
Keim (1985) presented evidence that stocks with different yields also have different risk 
characteristics.  Zero-dividend-yield stocks and stocks with low ￿dividend ￿yields have  
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significantly higher betas than do high-yield stocks.  This finding implies that it may be a 
nontrivial task to choose the optimal risk-return tradeoff while ignoring dividend yield. 
Depending on the precise assumptions made, some models that incorporate risk are 
similar to the simple static model, in that there is a tax effect and dividend policy affects value.  
On the other hand, other models are similar to the static clientele model in that there is no tax 
effect and dividend policy does not affect value.  Therefore, most of the literature has focused on 
the issue of whether or not there is a tax effect. 
Brennan (1970) was the first to develop an after-tax version of the CAPM.  Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979, 1980) extend his model to incorporate borrowing and short-selling 
constraints.  In both cases, the basic result is that for a given level of risk, the compensation for a 
higher dividend yield is positively related to the differential taxes between dividends and capital 
gains: 
() ( ) R - d a + a + a = R - R E ft it 3 it 2 1 ft it β     (11) 
 
Equation (11) describes the equilibrium relation between a security￿s expected return E(Rit), its 
expected dividend yield (dit), and its systematic risk (β it).  Finding a significantly positive a3 is 
interpreted as evidence of a tax effect. That is, two stocks with the same risk exposure (same 
beta) will have the same expected return only if they have the same dividend yield. Otherwise, 
the stock with the higher dividend yield will have a higher expected return to compensate for the 
higher tax burden associated with the dividend. 
Several researchers have tested such a relation, including Black and Scholes (1974), 
Blume (1980), Morgan (1982), Poterba and Summers (1984), Keim (1985), Rosenberg and 
Marathe (1979), Miller and Scholes (1982), Chen, Grundy, and Stambaugh (1990), and Kalay  
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and Michaely (2000).  The empirical results are mixed.  Several of these studies find a positive 
yield coefficient, which they attribute to differential taxes.  
Black and Scholes (1974) performed one of the earliest (and one of the most influential) 
tests. Using annual data, and a slightly different version of equation (11), they tested the tax 
effect hypothesis:  
[] () N 1,..., = i    , + d / d - d + - R
~ + = R
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i = the rate of return on the ith portfolio 
  




m= the rate of return on the market portfolio 
  
βi  = the systematic risk of the ith portfolio 
  
γ1  = the dividend impact coefficient 
  
di  = the dividend yield on the i
th portfolio, which is measured as the sum of dividends paid 
during the previous year divided by the end-of-year stock price 
 
dm= the dividend yield on the market portfolio measured over the prior 12 months 
  
εi  = the error term  
  
 
To test the tax effect, Black and Scholes formed portfolios of stocks and used a long-run 
estimate of dividend yield (the sum of prior-year dividends divided by year-end price). Their null 
hypothesis was that the dividend-yield coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  This 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for the entire time period (1936 through 1966) or for any of the 
ten-year subperiods.  Black and Scholes concluded that ￿... it is not possible to demonstrate that  
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the expected returns on high yield common stocks differ from the expected return on low yield 
common stocks either before or after taxes.￿  
In a series of studies, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1980, 1982) re-examined this 
issue.
6  Their experimental design differs from that of Black and Scholes (1974) in several 
important aspects. They use individual instead of grouped data, and they correct for the error in 
variables problems in the beta estimation by using maximum likelihood procedures.  Perhaps 
most important, they classify stock into yield classes by using a monthly definition of dividend 
yield, rather than a long-term dividend yield definition as in Black and Scholes (1974).  
The Litzenberger and Ramaswamy experiment involves three steps.  First, they estimate 
the systematic risk of each stock for each one of the test months.  The estimation uses the market 
model regression.  Formally,  
() 1, - t 60,..., - t = j       ε + R - R β + a = R - R it fj mj it it ft it    (13) 
 
where Rmj is the return on the market portfolio during period j, Rij is the rate of return on stock i 
during period j, β it is the estimated beta for stock i for period t, the riskless rate of interest during 
period t is Rft, and ε it is a noise term.  The second stage uses the estimated beta for stock i during 
month t, β it, and an estimate of stock i￿s expected dividend yield for month t, dit, as independent 
variables in the following cross-sectional regression for month t: 
() 1...N = i            + R - d a + a + a = R - R i ft it 3t it 2t 1t ft it ε β    (14) 
 
The experiment requires an ex-ante estimate of the test month dividend yield.  They obtain the 
estimate of expected dividend yield for month t from past observations.  For cases in which the 
dividends are announced at month t-1, the estimate is dt/pt-1.   
                                                 
6 The econometric technique used by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy to correct for the errors in variables problem 
represents a significant contribution to the empirical asset pricing literature.  However, we do not review  it here,  
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  When the announcement and ex-date occur in month t, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
had to estimate the market￿s time t expected dividend as of the end of month t-1.  The estimate 
they chose was the last dividend paid during the previous 12 months.  If no dividends were paid 
during this period, they assumed that the expected dividend was zero.  
They repeated the second step for every month included in the period 1936 to 1977. They 
estimated β it+1 by using the previous 60 months of data. They provided an updated estimate of 
the expected dividend yield for each stock for each one of the test months.  
This sequence of cross-sectional regressions results in a time series of a3t￿s.  The estimate 
of a3 is the mean of this series.  They compute the standard error of the estimate from the time 
series of the a3t￿s in a straightforward manner.  Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 1980) found 
that a3 was positive and significantly different from zero.  Using MLE and GLS procedures, 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy corrected for the error in variables and heteroskedasticity 
problems presented in the data.  However, the empirical regularity they documented ￿ a positive 
and statistically significant dividend yield coefficient ￿was not sensitive to which method they 
used.  The various procedures yielded similar estimated coefficients with minor differences in 
the significance level.  Litzenberger and Ramaswamy interpreted their finding as consistent with  
Brennan￿s (1970) after-tax CAPM.  That is, the positive dividend yield coefficient was evidence 
of a dividend tax effect.  
Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that the positive yield coefficient found by Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy was not a manifestation of a tax effect, but an artifact of two information 
biases.  First, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy￿s estimate of the next-month dividend yield could 
be correlated with month t information.  Of the firms paying dividends, about 40% announced 
                                                                                                                                                             
given the focus of this chapter.  
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and paid the dividend (i.e., the ex-dividend day) in the same month.  Using the Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy yield definition assumes that the ex-dividend month is known a priori even for ex-
months in which dividends were not declared in advance.  
Second, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy ignored the potential effect of dividend omission 
announcements.  An omission announcement, which is associated with bad news, will tend to 
bias upward the dividend yield coefficient, since it reduces the return of the zero yield group.  
The effect of these informational biases is the center of the debate between Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1982) and Miller and Scholes (1982).  
Miller and Scholes showed that when they included only dividends declared in advance 
in the sample, or when they defined the dividend yield as the dividend yield in month t-12, the 
yield coefficient was statistically insignificant.  Based on these results, Miller and Scholes 
attributed the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy results to information, rather than tax effects.   
Responding to this criticism, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) constructed a 
dividend yield variable that incorporated only such information as investors could possess at the 
time.  Their sample contained only stocks that either declared in month t-1 and paid in month t, 
or stocks that paid in month t-1 and therefore were not likely to repay in the current month.  
Using the ￿information-free￿ sample, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy found the yield coefficient 
was positive and significant.  Miller and Scholes remained unconvinced.  
To resolve the informational issue, Kalay and Michaely (2000) performed the 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy experiment on weekly data, excluding all weeks containing both 
the announcement and ex-day (3.4% of the sample). They also excluded all weeks containing 
dividend omission announcements. Nevertheless, they found a positive and significant yield 
coefficient, implying that information is not the driving force behind the Litzenberger and  
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Ramaswamy result. The question still remains whether the positive yield coefficient found by 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy can be attributed to taxes.  Kalay and Michaely (2000) argue that 
the single-period model derived by Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) 
predicts  cross-sectional return variation as a function of dividend yield. In contrast, the 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy test of Brennan￿s model is inadvertently designed to discover 
whether the ex-dividend period offers unusually large risk-adjusted returns (i.e., time-series 
return variation).   
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy classified stocks as dividend-paying stocks only during the 
ex-dividend months. For example, they classify a stock that pays quarterly dividends to the zero 
dividend yield group in two thirds of the months. Therefore, when Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
find a significant positive dividend yield coefficient in a Fama-Macbeth type test, it is not clear 
how to interpret these findings. Are their findings due to cross-sectional differences in dividend 
yield, which can then be interpreted as evidence consistent with the Brennan model, or are their 
results evidence of time-series variations in return between dividend-paying and non-dividend 
paying months? In other words, can we conclude from the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy results 
that higher-dividend-yield stocks show larger long-run (e.g., annual) risk-adjusted pretax returns 
(hereafter, cross-sectional return variations)? Or, do their results merely point out that stocks 
experience higher risk-adjusted pretax returns during their ex-month (hereafter, time-series 
return variations), and tell us little about the relation between long-run pretax risk-adjusted 
returns and yields? Time-series return variation, per se, is not evidence of a tax effect. 
Since most stocks pay dividends quarterly, trying to avoid dividend income involves 
realizing short-term capital gains. Under U.S. tax laws, short-term capital gains are taxed as 
ordinary income. Thus, even though a long-term investor prefers long-term capital gains to  
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dividend income, he or she does not require a larger pretax risk-adjusted return during only the 
ex-dividend period. Therefore, the implications of the Brennan model, combined with the U.S. 
tax code, is that differences in tax rates between dividend income and long-term capital gains 
income should result in cross-sectional return variation. As do other studies (such as the ex-day 
studies), Kalay and Michaely find strong evidence of time-series return variation around the ex-
day period. However, there is no evidence of cross-section return variation. This result does not 
support the Brennan￿s and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy￿s buy-and-hold models. 
Another potential problem is whether some omitted risk factors (other than beta) that are 
correlated with dividend yield, rather than taxes, can explain the positive yield coefficient.  As a 
first indication of the potential importance of some omitted risk factors, Miller and Scholes 
(1982) demonstrated that when the reciprocal of price, (1/P), is incorporated in the regression 
equation instead of the dividend yield, (D/P), its coefficient is still positive and significant.  This 
issue was thoroughly investigated by Chen, Grundy, and Stambaugh (1990). Categorizing all 
dividend-paying stocks into 20 portfolios according to size and yield, they found that when they 
used a single risk factor, large firms with high dividend yield were the only ones to experience a 
positive yield coefficient; and when they used two risk factor models, the yield coefficient was 
significant for only one of the 20 portfolios.  
As also suggested by Miller and Scholes (1982) and Hess (1983), Chen, Grundy, and 
Stambaugh (1990) presented evidence that dividend yield and risk measures were cross-
sectionally correlated. When they allowed the risk measures to vary, they found that the yield 
coefficient was positive but insignificant. Chen, Grundy, and Stambaugh showed that the 
positive association between yield and their portfolios￿ returns could be explained by a time-
varying risk premium that was correlated with yield. Thus, they concluded that there was no  
 36 
reliable relation between cross-sectional variation in returns and dividend yield that is a 
consequence of a tax penalty.  
Fama and French (1993) offer an interesting insight that is relevant to this issue. They 
argue that the yield coefficient might capture factors other than taxes, and that those other factors 
might affect assets￿ returns. They then show that when using the three-factor model, there is no 
trace of different intercepts among portfolios with different dividend yields. 
Summing up, a growing body of evidence shows that within static, single-period 
equilibrium models, there is no convincing evidence of a significant cross-sectional relation 
between stocks￿ returns and their dividend yields.  Perhaps a more promising avenue for 
investigating this issue is to examine a model that allows for dynamic trading around the ex-
dividend day.  
 
5.2  Dynamic models 
An important development in the literature on taxes and dividends was the realization 
that investors could trade dynamically to reduce their tax liability.  The first paper to emphasize 
this aspect was that of Miller and Scholes (1978).  They argued that there were a number of 
dynamic strategies that allowed investors to avoid taxes, and that in perfect capital markets all 
taxes could be avoided. This observation brings us back to the case in which dividend policy is 
irrelevant. However, in practice, the transaction costs of pursuing these strategies appear to be 
too high to make them empirically significant.  
An area where dynamic strategies appear to be more empirically relevant is trading 
around the ex-date.  A number of studies, starting with Kalay (1982), have studied the 
implications of this strategy.  We look at both types of approach.   
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5.2.1. Dynamic tax avoidance strategies 
Miller and Scholes (1978) suggested an ingenious strategy for avoiding taxes.  By 
borrowing and investing the proceeds with tax-free institutions, such as insurance companies or 
pension funds, investors could create an interest deduction that allowed them to avoid taxes. 
Since there were assets that were held to offset the borrowing, the position could be closed out at 
an appropriate point.   
Several other dynamic tax avoidance strategies were suggested by Stiglitz (1983).  If 
individuals can easily ￿launder￿ dividends so they ￿do not have to pay taxes on them, then 
essentially, we are back in a Miller and Modigliani world, and dividend policy is irrelevant.   
However, there is little evidence that investors are actually usually this or other such 
strategies.  Peterson, Peterson, and Ang (1985) showed that individual investors￿ marginal tax on 
dividend income has been about double the marginal tax rate they pay on capital gains income.  
This evidence does not support a widespread use of tax avoidance strategies of the type 
described by Miller and Scholes. Rather, it suggests that the transaction costs of such strategies 
are too high to be useful to investors. 
 
5.2.2. Dynamic ex-dividend day strategies 
Several studies have considered dynamic trading strategies around the ex-dividend day.  
The basic idea is that investors can change their trading patterns around the ex-dividend day to 
capture or avoid the upcoming dividend. Kalay (1982) argued that in a risk-neutral world, 
without any restrictions or imperfections such as transaction costs, dynamic arbitrage could 
eliminate a tax effect in prices.  Traders with the same tax rate on dividends and capital gains  
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will buy the stock before it goes ex-dividend and sell it just after.  Without risk or transaction 
costs, the arbitrage will ensure that the price drop is equal to the dividend, i.e., 
  ()1. =  /D P - P A B               ( 1 5 )  
If there are transaction costs, and no price uncertainty, then()  /D P - P A B  must lie within a range 
around one.  This range will be larger the greater are transaction costs. However,  Kalay (1982)  
did not explicitly account for the risk involved in the ex-day trading. 
  The framework used by Michaely and Vila (1995) describes the ex-day price formation 
within a dynamic equilibrium framework in which, because of taxes, agents have a 
heterogeneous valuation of a publicly traded asset.  The intuition behind their model is that an 
investor equates the marginal benefit of trading that arises from being more heavily invested in 
the dividend-paying stock with the marginal cost that arises from the deviation from optimal risk 
sharing. 
Agents trade because they have heterogeneous valuation of dividends relative to capital 
gains (on an after-tax basis).  This framework incorporates short-term, corporate, and individual 
investors￿ desire to trade around the ex-dividend day. The model explicitly accounts for the risk 
involved in the trade, and concludes that it is not arbitrage, but equilibrium, that determines 
prices and volume.  In other words, the existence of risk precludes pure arbitrage opportunities 
and prices are determined in equilibrium. Consequently, no trader will attempt to take an 
unlimited position in the stock, regardless of his or her tax preference.   
The model illustrates that although two-period models like those of Brennan (1970) or 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) adequately describe the effect of taxes on portfolio 
holdings in a static equilibrium, they mask a qualitative difference between models of financial 
markets with and without taxation, namely, optimal tax-induced trading.  Because of the  
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dynamic nature of the Michaely and Vila model, it is possible to derive volume and price 
behavior implications.  As it turns out, they can extract the second moment of the heterogeneity 
distribution (i.e., the dispersion in the after-tax valuation of dividends) from the trading volume 
around the ex-day.  
Using this framework, it is possible to show that in equilibrium, the expected price drop 
in relation to the dividend reflects the average preference of all traders, weighted by their risk 









σ α       ( 1 6 )  
where 
E(Pr) = is the expected price drop in relation to the dividend amount (hereafter, ￿the 
premium￿) 
 
Pc = the cum-day price 
 
Pe = the ex-day price 
  




ε  = the ex-day variance 
 
K  = the after-tax weighted average of investors￿ risk tolerance 
  

























As it turns out, unless a perfect tax clientele exists in which different groups hold 
different stocks rather than just different quantities of the same stock, it is not possible to infer 
tax rates from price alone.  However, we can infer the cross-sectional distribution of tax rates by 
using both price and volume data.  By observing the premium alone, we can infer only the 
weighted￿average relative tax rates, not the entire distribution of tax rates for the trading 
population. Michaely and Vila (1995) show that the second moment of the distribution could be 
extracted from the volume behavior on the ex-dividend day.7  
This point can be illustrated by the following example.  Assume that there are three 
groups of traders in the marketplace with a marginal rate of substitution between dividends and 
capital gains income of 0.75, 1.0, and 1.25, respectively.  Assume further that the average price 
drop relative to the dividend amount is one.  Using the standard analysis, we can conclude that 
the second group dominates the ex-dividend day price determination.   
However, this conclusion might not be valid.  For example, suppose that half of the 
traders are from the first group and half are from the third group, and both have the same effect 
on prices.  This market composition will also result in a relative price drop equal to the dividend 
amount.  The only way to distinguish between the two scenarios is by incorporating volume into 
the analysis.  In the first case, there are no gains from trade, and therefore no excess volume on 
the ex-dividend day.  In the second case, there are gains from trade, excess volume is observed, 
and the particular equilibrium point is at a relative price drop equal to one.  The model allows the 
resreacher to distinguish between such cases.  







σ α α ∑       ( 1 7 )  
                                                 
7 Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) provide a model in which proportional 
transactions costs faced by different classes of traders induce a non-
linear relationship between ex-day price movement and dividend yield.  
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where AV is the abnormal trading volume on the ex-dividend day. 
This framework also incorporates the Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982) analyses 
in equation (17).  Both analyses assume an arbitrage framework in the sense that the last term in 
equation (17) is zero, i.e., there is no risk involved in the trade.  Elton and Gruber assume that for 
some exogenous reason (e.g., transaction costs), the only trade around the ex-day will be done by 
investors within the same tax clientele group.  In other words, if there is a perfect holding 
clientele and all trading is done intra-group, then the relative price drop will reflect the marginal 
value of dividends relative to capital gains.  (Note that in this scenario, the marginal and the 
weighted average values are the same.) In this case there are two reasons why there will be no 
abnormal trading volume around the ex-dividend day.  First, since all trades are within the same 
clientele group, all relevant traders value the dividend equally, and there are no gains from trade.  
Second, there are no incentives for investors within the clientele group to delay or accelerate 
trades because of the upcoming dividends as, for example, suggested by Grundy (1985). In other 
words, Elton and Gruber suggest that taxes affect price, but do not locally affect investors￿ 
behavior [no extra trading, as in equation (17)]. Kalay takes the opposite view.  Taxes affect 
behavior but not prices, i.e., through their trading the arbitrageurs will ensure that the price drop 
equals the dividend amount.  Since Kalay uses the arbitrage framework, he can show that short-
term investors may take an unlimited position in the stock as long as the expected price drop is 
not equal to the dividend amount.  
Tests of these propositions have taken several forms.  Most studies examine the price 
behavior and infer investors￿ preferences and behavior from prices.  With only a few exceptions 
[Grundy (1985), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), Michaely and Vila (1995, 1996), and 
Michaely and Murgia (1995)], researchers have devoted much less attention to a direct  
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examination by using volume to determine the effect of differential taxes on investors￿ trading 
behavior. Researchers have almost always found that the average price drop between the cum- 
and the ex-day is lower than the dividend amount [see Elton and Gruber (1970), Kalay (1982), 
Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984), and Poterba and Summers (1984), among others].
8 For example, 
Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984) find an excess return of 0.142% on the ex-dividend day and a 
cumulative excess return of 0.334% in the ten days surrounding the ex-day (day ￿5 to day +5, 
relative to the ex-dividend day). The positive abnormal return before the ex-day and the negative 
excess return after the ex-day indicate that investors who prefer dividends start to accumulate the 
stock several days before the event (its timing is known in advance). Likewise, the negative 
return after the event supports the notion that investors￿ selling after the ex-day is more gradual 
than we would predict in perfect markets. 
Many of these studies also find that the average premium increases with dividend yield 
[see, for example, Elton and Gruber (1970), Kalay (1982), Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) 
and Boyd and Jagannathan (1994)]. This finding is consistent with tax clienteles.  (The tax 
clientele we allude to can be either a holding clientele or a trading clientele.  Only examination 
of trading volume can separate the two.)  Corporations, which prefer dividends over capital 
gains, and tax free institutions, which are indifferent to the form of payment, hold high-yield 
stocks. The ex-day premium reflects those preferences. Eades, Hess, and Kim￿s (1984) findings 
of a premium greater than one for preferred stock is also consistent with this idea. That is, this 
group of stocks pays a high dividend yield, and the dominant traders of these stocks (at least 
around the ex-day) are the corporate traders, who prefer dividends. 
                                                 
8 For international evidence, see Kato and Loewenstein (1995) for the Japanese market, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1983) for the Canadian market, and Michaely and Murgia (1995) for the Italian market.  
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Another way to examine the effect of taxes on ex-day price behavior is to examine the 
effect of tax changes. If taxes affect investors￿ decisions on buying or selling stocks around the 
ex-day, a change in the relative taxation of dividends to capital gains should affect prices. 
Poterba and Summers (1984) looked at the British market before and after tax changes and found 
evidence that indicated a tax effect. Barclay (1987) compared the ex-day price behavior prior to 
the introduction of federal taxes in 1913 with its behavior in the years 1962 to 1985. He found 
that the average premium was not significantly different from one before the enactment of the 
federal taxes, and significantly below one after.  Barclay concluded that the higher taxes on 
dividends after 1913 caused investors to discount their value. 
Michaely (1991) examined the effect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) on ex-day stock 
price behavior. The 1986 TRA eliminated the preferential tax rates for long-term capital gains 
that had been adopted in 1921; dividend income and realized capital gains were taxed equally 
after the reform.  If taxes are at work, we would expect the premium to be closer to one after the 
1986 TRA. (The premium is defined as the price difference between the ex-day and the cum day, 
relative to the amount of dividend paid.) Surprisingly, this was not the case. The average 
premium, both before and after the TRA, was not lower than one. Comparing his results to the 
Elton and Gruber study, which used data from the 1960s, Michaely concludes that the change in 
the relative pricing of dividends between the 1960s and the 1980s was not because of taxes, but 
perhaps, because of the change in weights of the various trading groups. Facing lower transaction 
costs in the equity, options, and futures markets, institutional and corporate investors seem to 
trade more around the ex-day in the latter period.  Thus, their preferences have a greater effect on 
the price formation. These results are summarized in Table 8.  
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Although in static models, such as Brennan (1970) or Elton and Gruber (1970), 
transaction costs can be safely ignored (since investors trade only once), in the dynamic models 
they are potentially much more important. If investors trade in and out of stocks because of 
taxes, the multiple rounds of trades could result in a nontrivial cost of transacting. Disregarding 
risk, Kalay (1982) showed that the ￿arbitrage￿ by the short-term traders would take place as long 
as the level of transaction costs was low enough. Indeed, Karpoff and Walkling (1988, 1990) 
showed that excess returns were lower for stocks with lower transaction costs.  This is especially 
pronounced for stocks with high dividend yields, both on the NYSE/Amex and for Nasdaq 
stocks.  In other words, corporations and short-term traders have a greater effect on the ex-day 
prices of stocks with lower levels of transaction costs. 
When the risk involved in the ex-day trading is accounted for, the effect of transaction 
costs on trading is not as straightforward. Michaely, Vila, and Wang (1997) developed a formal 
model that incorporated the effect of both transaction costs and risk on ex-day prices and trading. 
As expected, they predicted that transaction costs would reduce the volume of trade.   
More interesting is the interaction between transaction costs and risk.  First, with or 
without transaction costs, risk reduces volume. However, unlike price, volume is negatively 
affected by the level of idiosyncratic risk.  As the level of transaction costs increases, systematic 
risk negatively affects the volume of trade.  The reason is simple.  Without transaction costs, 
investors can afford to hedge all of the systematic risk.  In the presence of transaction costs, the 
systematic risk is not completely hedged; therefore it affects the amount of trading.  
Empirical evidence supports these results. Grundy (1985), Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986), and Michaely and Vila (1996) show that the abnormal volume on and around the ex-day 
is significant. This evidence indicates that a perfect tax clientele where investors hold strictly  
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different stocks, does not exist.  (In a perfect clientele, no ex-day trading will take place, because 
each clientele group will strictly hold only stocks with the dividend yield appropriate to its type.)  
Moreover, the evidence questions the idea that the marginal tax rate can be inferred from prices 
alone.  
Michaely and Vila (1996) show that both risk and transaction costs affect volume. They 
demonstrate that stocks with lower transaction costs experience higher abnormal volume, and 
that the differences are substantial. For example, between 1988 and ￿1990, stocks with a low 
average bid-ask spread experienced an abnormal trading volume of 556% compared with an 
abnormal trading volume of 78% for high-spread stocks. The differences were even larger when 
they looked at only stocks with high dividend yields, where the incentives to trade are larger. 
Moreover, they find that idiosyncratic risk significantly affects trading volume and that market 
risk has a greater effect (negative) on trading volume when the level of transaction costs is 
higher.  
Some of these effects are captured in the following regression analysis: 
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                                   (18) 
where 
CAVi is the cumulative abnormal volume in the 11 days around the ex-dividend day,  
(D/P)i is the stock￿s dividend yield, calculated as the dividend amount relative to the 
cum-day price, 
σ i/σ m is the idiosyncratic risk scaled by the market risk during the same time period, 
β i is the systematic risk, and  
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SIZE is the market value of equity, which is used as a proxy for the cross-sectional 
variation in transaction costs. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Both the idiosyncratic risk and the systematic risk are negative (and significant). The 
idiosyncratic risk is about 35% higher (in absolute value) than the beta risk coefficient. The fact 
that both risk factors are significant indicates that investors do not hedge all of their risk 
exposure. If they did, the beta coefficient would have been zero. The reason for the incomplete 
hedging is transaction costs. 
Koski and Michaely (2000) report that ex-day trading volume increases more in orders of 
magnitude when traders are able to arrange the cum-day/ex-day trading using non-standard 
settlement days.  That is, by virtually eliminating the risk exposure and reducing transaction 
costs, volume increases significantly.  
Koski and Michaely (2000) examine very large block trades around the ex-day.  Block 
trades involve a large purchase and subsequent sale of the dividend-paying stock within minutes 
(with a different settlement day for each transaction).  These trades are done through bilateral 
bargaining between the two parties involved, usually Japanese insurance companies on the 
buying side and a U.S. institution on the selling side.  This procedure substantially reduces the 
risk exposure (and transaction costs) relative to ￿conventional￿ dividend-capture trading.
9 
  As discussed earlier, examining prices alone may mask investors￿ tax preferences and the 
trading motives that are related to taxes. Kalay (1982), and Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984), and 
more recently Bali and Hite (1998) and Frank and Jagannathan (1998), have raised two 
additional obstacles in interpreting the ex-day price drop as evidence that differential taxes affect 
                                                 
9 Michaely and Murgia (1995) show that the trading volume of both block trades and non-block trades (on the Milan 
stock exchange) increases substantially for stocks with high dividend yield and low transaction costs. Their findings  
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prices and trading behavior. First, that discreteness in prices may cause a bias in measuring the 
ex-day price drop relative to the dividend. (Until recently, the minimum tick size was one eighth 
in the U.S.) These studies, and those by Dubofsky (1992) and Bali and Hite (1998), show that 
this bias may cause the average price drop to be less than the dividend amount. Second, that the 
high correlation between dividend yield and the dollar amount of dividend paid (high yield 
stocks tend to be stocks that pay large dividends) can also result in an association between 
relative price drop and dividend yields￿the very same evidence that many studies have 
attributed to dividend clienteles.  Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Frank and Jagannathan (1998) 
present supporting evidence.  Frank and Jagannathan find that the average price drop is less than 
the dividend in Hong Kong, where dividends and capital gains are not taxed. Eades, Hess, and 
Kim (1984) find that the average price drop is less than the dividend for non-taxable distributions 
in the U.S. This collective evidence seems to indicate that institutional factors such as tick size 
play a role in the determination of the ex-day prices.  
However, in light of the results of other studies, the conclusion that the entire ex-day 
price anomaly is driven by the tick size is unlikely. For example, Barclay (1987) finds that prior 
to the introduction of the income tax in the U.S., the average ex-day price drop was equal to the 
dividend amount, despite the fact that even then, prices were quoted in discrete multiples. 
Michaely (1991) also finds that the average price drop around the 1986 TRA was essentially 
equal to the dividend amount (see Table 8). Again, also during this time period, prices were 
quoted in one-eighth increments. 
Green and Rydqvist (1999) conducted an experiment relevant to this issue using data on 
Swedish lottery bonds. Taxes in the lottery bond market lead investors to prefer cash to capital 
gains. Some of the friction identified in the literature, such as price discreteness, would work in 
                                                                                                                                                             
support the notion that low transaction costs enhance ex-day trading.  
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the opposite way. In addition, the activity of arbitrageurs is not an issue. Green and Rydqvist find 
that both the price drop around the ex-day and volume behavior around this event reflects the 
relative tax advantage of the cash distribution.  Their findings support the interpretation of the 
ex-day price behavior as tax-motivated and that this behavior cannot be attributed to market 
frictions.   
  The information on volume behavior in the U.S. (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986, 
Michaely and Vila, 1996) and other countries such as Italy (Michaely and Murgia, 1995), Japan 
(Kato and Lowenstein, 1995), and Sweden (Green and Rydqvist, 1999) also clearly indicates that 
there is abnormal activity around the ex-dividend day.  The evidence also shows that the trading 
activity is positively related to the magnitude of the dividend and negatively related to the level 
of transaction costs and risk. The evidence is consistent with the notion that this trading activity 
is related to differential taxes.  
 
5.3  Dividends and taxes ￿ conclusions 
Differential taxes affect both prices (at least around the ex-dividend day) and investors￿ 
trading decisions. In most periods examined, the average price drop is less than the dividend 
paid, implying a negative effect on value. The entire price behavior cannot be attributed to 
measurement errors or market frictions. However, it is also rather clear that market imperfections 
such as transaction costs, the inability to fully hedge, and price discreteness inhibit tax-motivated 
trading. Absent these imperfections, it is possble that no trace of the tax effect would show up in 
the pricing data. So, while in perfect and complete capital markets dividends may not affect 
value, this relation is much less clear in incomplete markets with transaction costs.  The theory  
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and some of the empirical evidence indicate that taxes do matter, and that dividends reduce value 
when risk cannot be fully hedged and transactions are costly. 
Overall, the evidence from the ex-day studies appears to indicate that from a tax 
perspective, dividends should be minimized.  The volume of trade around these events is much 
higher than usual, indicating that the shares change hands from one investor ￿ group to the other.  
This evidence tells us that taxes affect behavior.   
The facts also indicate that a pure dividend-related tax ￿clientele does not exist. First, 
there is clear evidence for intergroup ex-day trading that is motivated by taxes.  It is also 
apparent that ex-day trading volume increases as the degree of tax heterogeneity among investors 
increases.  This evidence suggests that as the benefits of trading increase, so does trading 
volume. Second, direct examination of individuals￿ tax returns indicates that throughout most of 
the period 1973-1999, individuals in high tax brackets receive substantial amounts of taxable 
dividends, which refutes the tax clientele argument. Third, there is no evidence that dividend 
changes indicate any significant clientele shift, as we would expect if dividend clienteles did 
exist.  
One way of looking for evidence of clientele shifts is to see whether the turnover rate for 
firms that initiate or omit dividends shows a marked change following the announcement. 
Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson (1986) do this for 192 firms that initiated dividends. They 
concluded that the volume response is primarily in response to the news contained in the 
initiation announcement rather than to a clientele shift.  Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) 
examined the turnover of both initiating and omitting firms. They concluded that the relatively 
minor increase in volume around the event and the absence of an increase in the six months 
thereafter was too low to be consistent with a significant clientele shift.    
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Michaely, Thaler and Womack also directly investigated whether the share of 
institutional ownership changed after dividend omission. For the 182 firms with available data, 
they found that the average institutional ownership was 30% in the three years prior to the 
omission and was 30.9% after. This evidence further supports the impression that dividend 
changes do not produce dramatic changes in ownership.  
However, Brav and Heaton (1998) find a drop in institutional ownership around dividend 
omissions after the ERISA regulations took effect in 1974. Binay (2001) examines both 
initiations and omissions and reports a significant drop in institutional ownership after omissions 
and an increase in institutional ownership after initiations. Perez-Gonzalez (2000) looks at 
changes in firms￿ dividend policy as a result of tax reforms. He finds that dividend policy is 
much more affected by the tax reform when the largest shareholder is an individual than it is 
when the largest shareholder is an institution or when there is no large shareholder. Finally, Del 
Guercio (1996) examines the role of dividends in the portfolio selection of institutions. She finds 
that after controlling for several other factors such as market capitalization, liquidity, risk, and 
S&P ranking, dividend yield has no power in explaining banks￿ portfolio choice, and is a 
negative indicator in mutual funds￿ portfolio choice. Overall, her evidence indicates that the 
prudent man rule has a role in portfolio selection but that dividends do not play a major role in it. 
In light of the above discussion, perhaps it is less surprising that tests of the static models 
with taxes have not been successful. These tests cannot accommodate dynamic trading strategies, 
which seem to be important in this context.  In addition, time-varying risk may result in spurious 
positive yield coefficients (Chen, Grundy, and Stambaugh, 1990) and missing pricing factors can 
also result in a positive yield coefficient (Fama and French, 1993). As Naranjo, Nimalendran, 
and Ryngaert (1998) show, even when they do find a dividend yield effect, it is difficult to  
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attribute it to taxes, since it does not vary with relative taxation and is absent in large-cap stocks. 
Indeed, the ex-dividend day studies that account for these effects have been more successful in 
identifying the extent to which taxes affect prices and traders￿ behavior. 
 
6. Asymmetric Information and Incomplete Contracts -- Theory 
6.1 Signaling and adverse selection models  
Capital markets are imperfect, but not just because individuals and corporations have to 
pay taxes. Another potentially important imperfection relates to the information structure: if 
insiders have better information about the firm￿s future cash flows, many researchers suggest that 
dividends might convey information about the firm￿s prospects: dividends might convey 
information not previously known to the market, or they may be used as a costly signal to change 
market perceptions concerning future earnings prospects.  
Using the sources and uses of funds identity, and assuming the firm￿s investment is 
known, dividend announcements may convey information about current earnings (and maybe 
even about future earnings, if earnings are serially correlated) even in the absence of any 
signaling motive. Since investment is known, dividends are then the residual. Thus, larger-than-
expected dividends imply higher earnings. Since the market does not know the current level of 
earnings, higher-than-anticipated earnings would lead to a positive stock price increase. (When 
we talk about dividends in this context, what we really mean is net dividends. We define these in 
section 4 as dividends plus repurchases minus equity issues.) This interpretation of dividend 
announcements is not new and originated with Miller and Modigliani (1961) and later to the 
more formal argument in Miller and Rock (1985).  
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However, it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s that any signaling models were 
developed.  The best known are those of Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John 
and Williams (1985).  The basic intuitive idea in all these models is that firms adjust dividends to 
signal their prospects.  A rise in dividends typically signals that the firm will do better, and a 
decrease suggests that it will do worse.  These theories may explain why firms pay out so much 
of their earnings as dividends. Thus, they are consistent with the first empirical observation.   
However, in this context one of the central questions that arises is why firms use 
dividends, and not share repurchases or some other less costly means of signaling, to convey 
their prospects to investors. 
Bhattacharya (1979) used a two-period model in which the firm￿s managers act in the 
original shareholders￿ interests.  At time zero, the managers invest in a project.  The managers 
know the expected profitability of this investment, but investors do not.  At this time, the 
managers also ￿commit￿ to a dividend policy.  At time 1, the project generates a payoff that is 
used to pay the dividends committed to at time zero.  A crucial assumption of the model is that if 
the payoff is insufficient to cover the dividends, the firm must resort to outside financing and 
incur transaction costs in doing so.  
At time zero, the managers can signal that the firm￿s project is good by committing to a 
large dividend at time 1.  If a firm does indeed have a good project, it will usually be able to pay 
the dividend without resorting to outside financing and therefore will not have to bear the 
associated transaction costs.  In equilibrium, it is not worthwhile for a firm with a bad project to 
do this, because it will have to resort to outside financing more often and thus will have to bear 
higher transaction costs.  If the dividends are high enough, these extra costs will more than offset 
the advantage gained from the higher price received at time 1.  Since the critical trade-off in the  
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model is between the transaction costs incurred by committing to a large dividend and the price 
paid at time 1, it follows that similar results hold when the dividends are taxed. 
Just after the dividends are paid, the firm is sold to a new group of shareholders, which 
receives the payoff generated by the project at time 2.  The payoffs in the two periods are 
independent and identically distributed.  The price that the new shareholders are prepared to pay 
at time 1 depends on their beliefs concerning the profitability of the project.   
Bhattacharya￿s model was a significant step forward.  It is consistent with the observation 
that firms pay dividends even when these are taxed.  However, Bhattacharya￿s model has been 
criticized on the grounds that it does not explain why firms use dividends to signal their 
prospects.  It would seem that firms could signal better if they used share repurchases instead of 
dividends.   This way of signaling would result in the same tradeoff between the transaction costs 
of resorting to outside financing and the amount received when the firm is sold, but it would 
result in lower personal taxes than when dividends are used.  
Bhattacharya￿s model, like many dividend signaling models, has the feature that 
dividends and share repurchases are perfect substitutes for one another. It does not matter 
whether the ￿good￿ firm signals its value through repurchasing shares or paying dividends, 
because the end result will be the same: the payout increases the chances that the firm will need 
outside financing that is costly. Therefore, one of the implications of these models is that 
dividends and repurchases are perfect substitutes, an issue we return to in a later section. 
Bhattacharya￿s model reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the dividend 
signaling literature. Its main strength is that it is able to explain the positive market reaction to 
dividend increases and to announcements of share repurchases. The explanation is based on an 
intuitive notion that dividends tell us something about the firm￿s future prospects. The model is  
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internally consistent and assumes that both investors and management behave in a rational 
manner.  
However, like many such models, several of its assumptions are subject to some 
criticism. For example, why would a management care so much about the stock price next 
period? Why is its horizon so short that it is willing to ￿burn money￿ (in the form of a payout) 
just to increase the value of the firm now, especially when the true value will be revealed next 
period? It is also not clear from this model why firms smooth dividends. Finally, why should a 
firm use dividends (or repurchases) to signal? It would be more dramatic to burn the money in 
the middle of Wall Street, and it might even be cheaper. 
The dissatisfaction with early models led to the development of a number of alternative 
signaling theories.  Miller and Rock (1985) also constructed a two-period model.  In their model, 
at time zero firms invest in a project, the profitability of which cannot be observed by investors.  
At time 1, the project produces earnings and the firm uses these to finance its dividend payment 
and its new investment.  Investors cannot observe either earnings or the new level of investment.  
An important assumption in the Miller and Rock model is that some shareholders want to sell 
their holdings in the firm at time 1, and that this factor enters managers￿ investment and payout 
decisions.   
At time 2, the firm￿s investments again produce earnings.  A critical assumption of the 
model is that the firm￿s earnings are correlated through time.  This setting implies that the firm 
has an incentive to make shareholders believe that the earnings at time 1 are high so that the 
shareholders who sell will receive a high price.  Since both earnings and investment are 
unobservable, a bad firm can pretend to have high earnings by cutting its investment and paying  
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out high dividends instead.  A good firm must pay a level of dividends that is sufficiently high to 
make it unattractive for bad firms to reduce their investment enough to achieve the same level. 
The Miller and Rock theory has a number of attractive features.  The basic story, that 
firms shave investment to make dividends higher and signal high earnings, is entirely plausible. 
Unlike the Bhattacharya (1979) model, the Miller and rock theory does not rely on assumptions 
that are difficult to interpret, such as firms being able to commit to a dividend level.   
What are its weaknesses?  It is vulnerable to the standard criticism of signaling models 
that we discuss above. It is not clear that if taxes are introduced, dividends remain the best form 
of signal.  It appears that share repurchases could again achieve the same objective, but at a 
lower cost.   
In Bhattacharya (1979), the dissipative cost that allowed signaling to occur was the 
transaction cost of having to resort to outside financing.  In Miller and Rock (1985), the 
dissipative costs arise from the distortion in the firm￿s investment decision.  John and Williams 
(1985) present a model in which taxes are the dissipative cost.  The theory thus meets the 
criticism that the same signal could be achieved at a lower cost if the firm were to repurchase 
shares instead. So while the Miller and Rock and the Bhattacharya models imply that dividends 
and repurchases are perfect substitutes, the John and Williams model implies that dividends and 
repurchases are not at all related. A firm cannot achieve its objective of  higher valuation by 
substituting a dollar of dividends for a dollar of capital gains. 
What is the reasoning behind this result?  Like other models, John and Williams￿s 
starting point is the assumption that shareholders in a firm have liquidity needs that they must 
meet by selling some of their shares.  The firm￿s managers act in the interest of the original 
shareholders and know the true value of the firm. Outside investors do not.  If the firm is  
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undervalued when the shareholders must meet their liquidity needs, then these shareholders 
would be selling at a price below the true value.  However, suppose the firm pays a dividend, 
which is taxed. If outside investors take this as a good signal, then the share price will rise. 
Shareholders will have to sell less equity to meet their liquidity needs and will maintain a higher 
proportionate share in the firm.  
Why is it that bad firms do not find it worthwhile to imitate good ones?  When dividends 
are paid, it is costly to shareholders because they must pay taxes on them.  But there are two 
benefits.  First, shareholders receive a higher price for the shares that are sold.  Second, and more 
importantly, these shareholders retain a higher proportionate share in the firm. If the firm is 
actually undervalued, this higher proportionate share is valuable to the shareholder.  If the 
managers￿ information is bad and the firm is overvalued, the opposite is true.  It is this difference 
that allows separation.  If dividends are costly enough, only firms that are actually good will 
benefit enough from the higher proportionate share to make it worthwhile bearing the cost of the 
taxes on the dividends. 
John and Williams￿s model thus avoids the objection to most signaling theories of 
dividends.  Firms do not repurchase shares to avoid taxes, because it is precisely the cost of the 
taxes that makes dividends desirable.  This is clearly an important innovation.   
What are the weaknesses of the John and Williams￿ theory? In terms of assumptions, they 
take it as a given that shareholders must meet their liquidity needs by selling their shares.  They 
rule out the use of debt, either by the firm or the shareholders themselves.  We could ask why the 
firm does not borrow and use the proceeds to repurchase its shares.  Again, doing so would meet 
the liquidity needs of investors and would only be worthwhile if the firm￿s shares were 
undervalued.  It should be possible to signal the firm￿s value costlessly by repurchasing shares  
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and thus increasing the proportionate share held by the firm. The Ross (1977) study shows that 
borrowing serves as a credible signal.   Even if, for some reason, corporate borrowing is not 
possible, an alternative is for the investors to borrow on their personal accounts instead of selling 
shares.  Again, this would allow them to meet their liquidity needs without incurring the cost of 
signaling.  
It is also not obvious that the John and Williams model￿s empirical implications support 
dividend smoothing.  The best way to extend the model over a longer time is not entirely clear.  
If firms￿ prospects do not change over time, then once a firm has signaled its type, no further 
dividend payments will be necessary and payouts can be made through share repurchases.  If 
firms￿ prospects are constantly changing, which seems more plausible, and if dividends signal 
these, we would expect that dividends will also constantly change. This prediction of the model 
is difficult to reconcile with the observation that corporations smooth dividends, and in many 
cases do not alter them at all for long periods of time.  We can also make the same criticism of 
the other signaling models. After the Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) 
papers, a number of other theories with multiple signals were developed.  Ambarish, John, and 
Williams (1987) constructed a single-period model with dividends, investment, and stock 
repurchases.  Williams (1988) developed a multi-period model with these elements  and showed 
that in the efficient signaling equilibrium, firms typically pay dividends, choose their investments 
in risky assets to maximize net present value, and issue new stock.  Constantinides and Grundy 
(1989) focused on the interaction between investment decisions and repurchase and financing 
decisions in a signaling equilibrium.  With investment fixed, a straight bond issue cannot act as a 
signal, but a convertible bond issue can.  When investment is chosen optimally rather than being 
fixed, this is no longer true; a straight bond issue can act as a signal.  
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Bernheim (1991) also provided a theory of dividends in which signaling occurs because 
dividends are taxed more heavily than repurchases. In his model, the firm controls the amount of 
taxes paid by varying the proportion of the total payout that is in the form of dividends, rather 
than repurchases. A good firm can choose the optimal amount of taxes to provide the signal. As 
with the John and Williams model, Bernheim￿s model does not provide a good explanation of 
dividend smoothing. 
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) took a different approach to dividend signaling. As in 
the previous models, dividends are a signal of good news (i.e., undervaluation). However, in 
their model firms pay dividends because they are interested in attracting a better-informed 
clientele. Untaxed institutions such as pension funds and mutual funds are the primary holders of 
dividend-paying stocks because they are a tax-disadvantaged payout method for other potential 
stockholders.  
Another reason for institutions to hold dividend-paying stocks is the restrictions in 
institutional charters, such as the ￿prudent man￿ rules that make it more difficult for many 
institutions to purchase stocks that pay either no dividends or low dividends. According Allen, 
Bernardo and Welsh (2000), the reason good firms like institutions to hold their stock is that 
these stockholders are better informed and have a relative advantage in detecting high firm 
quality. Low-quality firms do not have the incentive to mimic, since they do not wish their true 
worth to be revealed.  
Thus, taxable dividends are desirable because they allow firms￿ management to signal the 
good quality of their firms. Paying dividends increases the chance that institutions will detect the 
firm￿s quality.   
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Another interesting feature of the Allen, Bernardo, and Welch model is that it does 
accommodate dividend smoothing. Firms that pay dividends are unlikely to reduce the amount of 
the dividend, because their clientele (institutions) are precisely the kind of investors that will 
punish them for it. Thus, they keep dividends relatively smooth. 
As in the John and Williams model, the Allen, Bernardo, and Welch model involves a 
different role for dividends and repurchases. They are not substitutes. In fact, firms with more 
asymmetric information and firms with more severe agency problems will use dividends rather 
than repurchases. 
Kumar (1988) provided a theory of dividend smoothing. In his model, the managers who 
make the investment decision know the true productivity type of the firm but the outside 
investors do not. Also, because they are less diversified the managers want to invest less than the 
outside investors. Managers will try to achieve lower investment by underreporting the firm￿s 
productivity type.  
Kumar shows that there cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium in which dividends 
perfectly signal productivity. If there were such an equilibrium, shareholders could deduce the 
firm￿s true productivity type. However, this is inconsistent with managers underreporting.  
A coarse signaling equilibrium can exist, though. Within an interval of productivity, 
Kumar shows that it is optimal for the different types of firm to cluster at a corresponding 
dividend level. This theory is consistent with smoothing, because small changes in productivity 
will not usually move a firm outside the interval, so its dividend will not change. Unfortunately, 
this theory does not explain why share repurchases, which are taxed less, are not used instead of 
dividends. Kang and Kumar (1991) have looked at the empirical relation between firm  
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productivity and the frequency of dividend changes.  Their results are consistent with Kumar￿s 
analysis. 
The signaling models discussed here are important contributions. They are also 
intuitively appealing. Firms that pay dividends, and especially firms that increase their dividends, 
are firms that are undervalued by the market. Thus, the most important prediction that is 
common to all of these models is that dividends convey good news about the firm￿s future cash 
flows.  
The majority of the theoretical (and empirical) research has assumed that firms use 
dividend changes to signal changes in future earnings or cash flows. But given the less than 
enthusiastic empirical endorsement this prediction has received (as we describe in the next 
section), we might want to consider another possibility, that increases in dividends convey 
information about changes in risk rather than about growth in future cash flows..  
By definition, the fundamental news about a firm must be about either its cash flows or 
its discount rates (risk characteristics).  If the good news in a dividend increase is not about 
(expected) increases in future cash flow, then it might concern a decline in (systematic) risk.  
Current dividend-signaling models have very little to say about the relation between 
dividend changes and risk changes. Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) present an 
alternative explanation, which they refer to as the ￿maturity hypothesis.￿  They propose that 
there are several elements that contribute to firms becoming mature.  As firms mature, their 
investment opportunity set shrinks, resulting in a decline in their future profitability. But perhaps 
the most important consequence of a firm becoming mature is a change in its (systematic) risk 
characteristics, specifically, a decline in risk. The decline in risk most likely occurs because the 
firm￿s assets in place have become less risky and/or the firm has fewer growth opportunities  
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available. Finally, the decline in investment opportunities generates an increase in free cash 
flows, leading to an increase in dividends. Thus, a dividend increase indicates that a firm has 
matured. 
According to the maturity hypothesis, firms increase dividends when growth 
opportunities decline, which leads to a decrease in the firm￿s systematic risk and profitability. 
How, then, should the market react to a dividend increase?  The dividend increase clearly 
contains at least two pieces of news. The good news is that the risk has decreased, and the bad 
news is that profits are going to decline. The positive market reaction implies that news about 
risk dominates news about profitability.  
Another possibility is that because of agency considerations, investors treat dividend 
increases as good news, in spite of the declining profitability. For instance, if investors expect 
managers to squander the firm￿s wealth by overinvesting, then a dividend increase suggests that 
managers are likely to act more responsibly.  Thus, in addition to the good news conveyed about 
a risk reduction, investors might interpret a dividend increase as good news per se (they reduce 
the overinvestment problem), and the stock price would rise. Modeling the dynamic relation 
between firms￿ dividend policy, investment opportunities, and cost of capital is still an 
unexplored path that could yield valuable new insights into the determination of corporate 
payout policy. 
 
6.2 Incomplete contracts ￿ Agency models 
If we relax the assumption of complete (and fully enforceable) contracts, we realize that a 
firm is more than just a ￿black box.￿ The different forces that operate within a firm can, at 
different points in time, pull it in different directions, and the interests of different groups within  
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a firm may conflict. The three groups that are most likely to be affected the most by a firm￿s 
dividend policy are stockholders, management, and bondholders. 
The first conflict of interest that could affect dividend policy is between management and 
stockholders. As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers of a publicly held firm 
could allocate resources to activities that benefit them, but that are not in the shareholders￿ best 
interest.  These activities can range from lavish expenses on corporate jets to unjustifiable 
acquisitions and expansions. In other words, too much cash in the firm may result in 
overinvestment.  
Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986) have suggested a 
partial solution to this problem. If Equityholders can minimize the cash that management 
controls, they can make it much harder for management to go on (unmonitored) spending sprees. 
The less discretionary cash that management has, the harder it is for them to invest in negative 
NPV projects. One way to take unnecessary cash from the firm is to increase the level of payout.  
We note that these theories suggest a significant departure from the original Miller and 
Modigliani assumption in that payout policy and investment policy are interrelated. Paying out 
cash would increase firm value by reducing potential overinvestments. 
Cash payouts make an appealing argument, and as we will show, it also receives 
significant empirical support. But payouts also have several shortcomings. First, if managers 
want to overinvest, either to increase their power base by acquiring more firms, or simply to 
spend more on jets and hunting trips, what is the mechanism that will force them to commit to an 
action that will prevent them from doing so? Or is it the board of directors that forces them to 
change their payout policy? If so, what is the information structure and the enforcement 
mechanism between the board of directors and the management that allows the board to set the  
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appropriate dividend policy ex ￿ante, but not to monitor management￿s actions ex￿post?  Put 
another way, if the board (which we assume is independent of the management and cares about 
shareholders￿ best interests￿a very strong assumption indeed) knows that management 
overinvests, why can￿t it monitor it better?  
Several authors, most notably Zwiebel (1996), Fluck (1999), and Myers (2000), address 
this issue in the context of capital structure, but the basic insight for payout policy is 
straightforward. It must be in management￿s self-interest to maintain positive payout ex post. In 
contrast to the standard free cash flow stories, management voluntarily commits to pay out cash 
because of constant potential threat of some (limited) disciplinary actions. This is also the notion 
that the Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) paper brings to the payout policy issue. Their paper 
highlights the role of large outsider shareholders￿ constant monitoring role. 
Another question asks why firms pay out in the form of dividends and not share 
repurchases, since the latter are a cheaper way to take money out of management hands. A 
related question is why monitor through payout and not debt? As Grossman and Hart (1980) and 
Jensen (1986) argue, a more effective mechanism to achieve this goal is to increase the level of 
debt. It is harder for management to renege on a debt commitment relative to a dividend 
commitment. This argument can also be applied to the choice of dividends versus repurchases. If 
we take as given the empirical observation that the market strongly dislikes dividend reductions 
and that management is therefore reluctant to reduce dividends, then dividends represent a more 
effective mechanism than repurchases to impose discipline.  
Third, although the agency story offers a palatable explanation for dividend increases, it 
is much less so for dividend decreases. Firms increase their dividends when they have free cash 
flow, and the positive market reaction to the dividend announcement happens because the market  
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realizes that now management will have to be more disciplined in its action. But what about 
dividend cuts? One possibility is that management cuts dividends when cash flow, and hence 
free cash flow, has fallen. Another possibility is that management (or the board) cuts dividends 
when there are good investments, so the cut should also be greeted positively by the market. 
Needless to say, this does not happen.  In this case, the good investments could be financed by 
debt. 
The earlier work of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and the more recent work by Allen, 
Bernardo and Welch (2000) provides a framework that can overcome the first two problems 
(management incentive to pre-commit and dividends as opposed to repurchases). Building on the 
work of Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggested that because of 
conflict of interest, management should be monitored, and this monitoring must be done by large 
shareholders. The presence of such shareholders increases the value of the firm because of the 
monitoring role they play, and because they help facilitate takeover activities (even if they are 
not involved). Thus, the board has an incentive to induce major shareholders to take a position in 
the firm, especially if the firm is likely to have excess cash. 
Given the favorable tax treatment of dividends by some large shareholders such as 
corporations, it is possible that dividends are paid to attract this type of clientele. Allen, Bernardo 
and Welch (2000) extend this analysis and show that a favorable tax rate for institutions relative 
to individuals is enough for those large shareholders to prefer dividend-paying stocks. This 
observation is important, since now the analysis can encompass not only corporations (as in 
Shleifer and Vishny), but also various types of tax-free institutions. 
This clientele will increase the value to all shareholders, including individual 
shareholders, since it monitors the management and thereby increases the firm￿s value. Whether  
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indeed large shareholders are attracted to firms that pay dividends and much less to firms that 
repurchase their shares is an unresolved empirical issue that is worth pursuing.
10  
The second conflict of interest that may be affected by payout policy is between 
stockholders and bondholders.  As Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) have argued, 
there are some situations in which equityholders might try to expropriate wealth from 
debtholders. This wealth expropriation could come in the form of excessive (and unanticipated) 
dividend payments. Shareholders can reduce investments and thereby increase dividends 
(investment-financed dividends), or they can raise debt to finance the dividends (debt-financed 
dividends). In both cases, if debtholders do not anticipate the shareholders￿ action, then the 
market value of debt will go down and the market value of equity will rise. 
To summarize, in this section we presented two views of why dividends are paid. The 
first view is that dividends convey good news. The alternative view is that dividends are in 
themselves good news because they resolve agency problems. In the next section we review the 
corresponding empirical literature. 
 
7. Empirical Evidence 
7.1 Asymmetric information and signaling models 
In their original paper, Miller and Modigliani suggested that if management￿s 
expectations of future earnings affects their decisions about current dividend payouts, then 
changes in dividends will convey information to the market about future earnings.  This notion 
has been labeled as ￿the information content of dividends.￿  As discussed earlier, this notion has 
                                                 
10 Based on potential conflict of interest between outside share holders and the minority shareholders who manage 
the firm, Fluck (1999) presents an interesting idea in which the more effective outsiders are in disciplining 
management, the more they receive in dividends. Thus, the better outsiders are at monitoring, either because of the 
resources they devote to it or because of their fractional ownership, more of the profits will be distributed to  
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been formalized in two ways:  In the first, dividends are used as an ex-ante signal of future cash 
flow as, for example, in Bhattacharya (1979).  In the second, dividends provide information 
about earnings as a description of the sources and uses of funds identity as, for example, in 
Miller and Rock (1985).  The second alternative can be interpreted as saying that the fact that 
dividends convey information does not necessarily imply that they are being used as a signal.  
This distinction may be subtle, but it is crucially important in interpreting the empirical tests as 
supporting the signaling theory.  Most, if not all, of the empirical tests we are aware of cannot 
help us to distinguish between these two alternatives.  
The information/signaling hypotheses contain three important implications that have been 
tested empirically:   
(i) Dividend changes should be followed by subsequent earnings changes in the same direction.  
(ii) Unanticipated dividend changes should be accompanied by stock price changes in the same 
direction.  
(iii) Unanticipated changes in dividends should be followed by revisions in the market￿s 
expectations of future earnings in the same direction as the dividend change. 
It is important to note that all of the above implications are necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions for dividend signaling.  The condition that earnings changes will follow dividend 
changes is the most basic. If this condition is not met, we can conclude that dividends do not 
have even the potential to convey information￿at least not about future cash flows, ￿ let alone 
to signal.   
Most of the empirical literature has concentrated on the second implication, that 
unexpected dividends changes are associated with price changes in the same direction. 
Therefore, we start our review by describing the empirical findings on the association between 
                                                                                                                                                             
shareholders.  
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dividend changes and price changes. For example, Pettit (1972) showed that a significant price 
increase follows announcements of dividend increases, and a significant price drop follows 
announcements of dividend decreases.  Aharony and Swary (1980) showed that these price 
changes hold even after they controlled for contemporaneous earnings announcements.  Using a 
comprehensive sample of dividend changes of at least 10% over the period 1967-1993, Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) found that the average abnormal return to dividend increases 
was 1.34% (a median of 0.95%) and the average abnormal market reaction to dividend decreases 
was   ￿3.71% (a median of ￿2.05%).  
Table 9 describes some of the characteristics of firms that change their dividends. Both 
dividend-increasing and decreasing firms are larger than the typical NYSE/Amex firm. During 
the last four decades (the sample is from 1963 to 1998), the average dividend-increasing firm has 
a dividend yield of 3.74% before the dividend increase and the average dividend-decreasing firm 
has a dividend yield of 3.29% prior to the dividend decrease. The change in dividend is greater 
(in absolute terms) for firms that decrease their dividends (-44.8% compared to 31.1%), but the 
frequency of a decrease is smaller (1358 compared to 6284). 
Studies by Asquith and Mullins (1983) (dividend initiations), Healy and Palepu (1988), 
and Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) (dividend initiations and omissions) focused on 
extreme changes in dividend policy. Their research showed that the market reacts quite severely 
to those announcements.  The average excess return is 3.4% for initiation and ￿7% for omissions.  
  It seems that the market has an asymmetric response to dividend increases and decreases 
(and for initiations and omissions), which implies that lowering dividends carries more 
informational content than increasing dividends, perhaps because reductions are more unusual, 
or because reductions are of greater magnitude. Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) examined  
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this issue and found that when they controlled for the change in yield, the announcement of an 
omission had a larger impact on prices than did an announcement of an initiation.
 They also 
reported that the effect of a unit change in yield (say, a 1% change in yield) had a greater effect 
on prices for initiations than it did for omissions. The price impact may explain, to some extent, 
why managers are so reluctant to cut dividends. 
There seems to be general agreement that: 
(1) Dividend changes are associated with changes in stock price of the same sign around 
the dividend change announcement. 
(2) The immediate price reaction is related to the magnitude of the dividend. 
(3) The price reaction is not symmetric for increases and reductions of dividends. 
Announcements of reductions per se have a larger price impact than announcements 
of increases. 
Prices can tell us not only about the immediate market reaction to the dividend change, 
but also how the market perceived dividend-changing firms before the dividend change occurred 
and whether the market absorbed the information contained in the dividend change. It is clear 
that dividend-increasing firms have done well prior to the announcement and dividend-
decreasing firms have not done as well. For example, for the period 1947-1967 Charest (1978) 
found an abnormal performance of around 4% in the year prior to the dividend increase month 
and a negative 12% for the dividend decreasing firms. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) 
documented an average 8.6% abnormal return in the year prior to a dividend increase and ￿28% 
for firms that decreased dividends. For dividend initiations and omissions, the magnitude of the 
pre-announcement price movement was even more pronounced (Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 
1995).  
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What is perhaps more interesting and important, from both the corporate finance and the 
market efficiency perspectives, is the post-dividend-change performance. Charest (1978) found a 
4% abnormal return in the two years after dividend increase announcements and a negative 8% 
for dividend-decreasing firms. Using the Fama-French three-factor model Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan (2002) reported a three-year abnormal return of 8.3% for dividend increases, 
which is significant. They did not detect any abnormal performance for dividend-decreasing 
firms. Not surprisingly, the post-dividend abnormal performance was even more pronounced for 
initiations and omissions. Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) reported a market-adjusted 
return of almost 25% in the three years after initiations and a negative abnormal return of 15% in 
the three years after omissions. 
The post-dividend announcement drift is both encouraging and disturbing from the 
signaling-theory perspective. It is encouraging because it is consistent with the implication that 
dividend changes have some useful informational content. It is disturbing because it implies that 
even if firms try to signal through dividends, the market does not ￿get it￿￿or at least it does not 
get the full extent of the signal. Otherwise, the entire price reaction would have happened right 
after the announcement. The fact that the market doesn￿t get it (better future earnings or cash 
flows) is problematic, since the models described above rely on the rationality assumption. 
Investors and firms use the information at their disposal in the best possible way. The long-term 
drift does not support this assumption. In other words, if investors do not understand the signal, 
there is no incentive for those firms to use a costly signal.  
Our next step is to examine the fundamental implication of the signaling models-- that 
dividend changes and future earnings changes move in the same direction.  Watts (1973) was 
among the first to test the proposition that the knowledge of current dividends improves the  
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predictions of future earnings, over and above knowledge of current and past earnings.  Using 
310 firms with complete dividends and earnings information for the years 1946-67, and annual 
definitions of dividends and earnings, Watts tested whether earnings in year t+1 could be 
explained by the current (year t) and past (year t-1) levels of dividend and earnings.  For each 
firm in the sample, Watts estimated the current and past dividend coefficients (while controlling 
for earnings). Although he found that the average dividend coefficients across firms were 
positive, the average t-statistic was very low.  In fact, only the top 10% of the coefficients were 
marginally significant.  Using changes in levels yielded similar results.  He concluded that: ￿... in 
general, if there is any information in dividends, it is very small.￿  
Gonedes (1978) reached a similar conclusion. Penman (1983) also finds that after 
controlling for management￿s future earnings forecast, there was not much information conveyed 
by dividend changes themselves. Interestingly, Penman also reports that many firms with 
improved future earnings did not adjust their dividends accordingly. 
Somewhat more in line with the theory are Healy and Palepu￿s (1988) results. For their 
sample of 131 firms that initiated dividend payments, earnings had increased rapidly in the past 
and continued to increase for the following two years. However, for their sample of 172 firms 
that omitted a dividend payment, the results were the opposite of what signaling theory predicts. 
Earnings declined in the year in which the omission announcement took place, but then 
improved significantly in the next several years. For a sample of 35 firms that increased their 
dividends by more than 20%, Brickley (1983) found a significant earnings increase in the year of 
and the year after the dividend increase. 
Perhaps we can attribute the somewhat mixed results on the relation between current 
changes in dividends and future changes in earnings to the limited number of firms used in most  
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of these studies. Another factor that makes the task difficult is knowing how to model 
unexpected earnings.  
Using a large number of firms and events over the period 1979-1991 and several 
definitions of earnings innovations, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) investigate the 
relation between dividend changes and future changes in earnings. They measure earnings 
changes relative to the industry average changes in earnings that they adjusted for earnings 
momentum and for mean reversion in earnings. Two robust results emerge. First, there is a very 
strong lagged and contemporaneous correlation between dividend changes and earnings changes. 
When dividends are increased earnings have gone up. There is no evidence of a positive relation 
between dividend changes and future earnings changes. In the two years following the dividend 
increase, earnings changes were unrelated to the sign and magnitude of the dividend change.  
The results were strong but perverse for dividend decreases. Like Healy and Palepu 
(1988), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find a clear pattern of earnings increase in the two 
years following the dividend cut. Using a sample of firms that changed their dividends by more 
than 10%, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) confirmed these results. They show that 
not only do future earnings not continue to increase, but that the level of firms￿ profitability 
decreases in the years following announcement of dividend increases. Figure 4 presents these 
results. The figure shows that firms move from a period of increasing ROA before the dividend 
increase to a period of declining ROA after the dividend increase. 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) offer yet another look at this problem. They attempt to explain 
future innovation in earnings by the change in dividend, like Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 
(1997). They argue that a good control for mean reversion is the ratio of earnings to the book 
value of equity (ROE) and add it as an additional explanatory variable.  They advocate the  
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inclusion of ROE to improve the model of expected earnings, and to fix what they call an 
￿omitted correlated variables￿. Rather than adopting the natural convention of assigning a 
dividend change to the year in which it actually takes place, Nissim and Ziv change this 
convention by assigning dividend changes that occur in the first quarter of year t+1 to year t. 
Since we know that dividends are very good predictor of past and current earnings, this change is 
bound to strengthen the association between dividend changes and earnings growth in year 1. 
Indeed using this methodology, the dividend coefficient is significant in about 50% of the cases 
when next year￿s earning is the dependent variable. When using the more conventional 
methodology, it is significant in only 25% of the years. When using several independent 
variables in addition to ROE, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) do not find any significant 
relation between current changes in dividends and future changes in earnings. 
Using  the Fama and French (2000)  modified partial adjustment model to control for the 
predictable component of future earnings changes based on lagged earnings levels and changes, 
Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely, and Thaler (2002) re-examine the relation between dividends and 
earnings changes. Fama and French explicitly model the time-series of earnings in a way that 
captures the empirical fact that earnings changes are more mean-reverting in the tails. They show 
that their model explains the evolution of earnings much better than a model with a uniform rate 
of mean reversion.  We have thus adopted their methods to investigate this problem.11 .  The 
model is the following:    
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11 See Fama and French (2000) for a detailed discussion of this econometric model.  
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In this equation DFE0 is equal to  ROE0- E[ ROE0], where E[ ROE0] is the fitted value from the 
cross-sectional regression of  ROE0 on the log of total assets in year ￿1, the market-to-book ratio 
of equity in year ￿1, and  ROE− 1.  CE0 is equal to (- ) EE/ B -1 01 − .  NDFED0 (PDFED0) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise, and NCED0 
(PCED0) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative (positive) and 0 
otherwise.  As discussed in Fama and French (2000), the dummy variables and squared terms in 
Equation 19 are included to capture the fact that large changes in earnings revert faster than 
small changes and that negative changes revert faster than positive changes. It is important to 
control for these non-linearities in the behavior of earnings because assuming linearity when the 
true functional form is non-linear has the same consequences as leaving out relevant independent 
variables.   
The Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely, and Thaler (2002) estimation of equation 19 is 
presented inn Table 10.  They find no evidence that dividend changes contain information about 
future earnings growth.  The coefficient for  RD I V ∆  is not statistically different from zero when 
either year 1 earnings changes or year 2 earnings changes are the dependent variables.   
Furthermore, even for predictions of first year earnings growth, the coefficient for the dividend 
change is significant at the 10% level in only 4 out of the 34 years of the sample. For year 2 
earnings it is significantly positive at the 10% level in just 5 out of the 34 years. As documented 
in previous studies, this evidence suggests that dividend changes are very unreliable predictors of 
future earnings.   
The overall accumulated evidence does not support the assertion that dividend changes 
convey information about future earnings. Miller (1987) summarized the empirical findings this 
way: ￿￿dividends are better described as lagging earnings than as leading earnings￿.  Maybe, as  
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Miller and Rock (1985) suggested, dividends convey information about current earnings through 
the sources and uses of funds identity, not because of signaling. At the minimum, the empirical 
findings on the long-term price drift and the lack of positive association between dividend 
changes and future changes in earnings raise serious questions about the validity of the dividend 
signaling models. If firms are sending a signal through dividends, it is not a signal about future 
growth in earnings or cash flows, and the market doesn￿t get the message. Why would firms 
waste money by paying a costly dividend to send a signal that investors do not receive?  
In an interesting paper, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) examined 145 firms 
whose annual earnings growth declined in year zero, after at least nine years of consecutive 
earnings growth. Thus, year zero represented the first earnings decline in many years. Their test 
focused on the year zero dividend decision, which could have conveyed a lot of information to 
outsiders by helping the market to assess whether the decline in earnings was permanent or 
transitory. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner found no evidence that favorable dividend 
decisions (i.e., dividend increases) represented a reliable signal of superior future earnings 
performance. There was no evidence of positive future earnings surprises (and even some 
indications of negative earnings surprises) for the 99 firms that increased their dividends. Not 
only did the dividend-increasing firms not experience positive earnings surprises in subsequent 
years in absolute terms, their earnings performance was no better than those firms that did not 
change their dividend. Overall, there was no evidence that dividends had provided a useful signal 
about future earnings. 
None of us know for sure what market expectations are, either about prices or about 
earnings. But in the case of earnings, we can test for changes in market expectations by looking 
at the earnings estimates of Wall Street￿s analysts. This is how we can test the third implication  
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of the information/signaling theories, that unanticipated changes in dividends should be followed 
by revisions in the market￿s expectations of future earnings in the same direction as the dividend 
change. Ofer and Siegel (1987) used 781 dividend change events to examine how analysts 
change their forecast about the current year earnings in response to the dividend changes. 
Consistent with the positive association between dividend changes and actual changes in 
concurrent year earnings (the year of the dividend change), Ofer and Siegel found that analysts 
revised their current year earnings forecast by an amount that was positively related to the size of 
the announced dividend change.  They also provided evidence that their revision was positively 
correlated with the market reaction to the announced dividend.   
Most of the empirical research centers on the necessary conditions (price reaction, 
subsequent earnings and changes in earnings expectations) for dividend signaling. The outcome, 
as we have shown, is not encouraging. Several papers looked at the sufficient conditions for 
dividend signaling, most notably at taxes. Recall that tax-based dividend signaling theories are 
based on the idea that dividends are more costly than repurchases, and that managers 
intentionally use this costly device to signal information to the market.  
Bernheim and Wantz (1995) investigated the market reaction to dividend changes during 
different tax regimes. In periods when the relative taxes on dividends are higher than taxes on 
capital gains, the signaling hypothesis implies that the market reaction to dividend increases 
should be stronger, because it is more costly to pay dividends. Since it is more expensive to 
signal,  the signals are more revealing for those who choose to use them. The free ￿cash flow 
hypothesis makes the opposite prediction.  Since it is more expensive to pay dividends and the 
benefit presumably does not change, when the taxes on dividends are relatively higher, the 
market should react less favorably to dividend increases.  Bernheim and Wantz￿s results are  
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consistent with the dividend-signaling hypothesis. In periods of higher relative taxes on 
dividends, the market reaction to dividend payments is more favorable.  
However, applying nonparametric techniques that account for the nonlinear properties 
common to many of the dividend-signaling models in an experiment similar to Bernheim and 
Wantz (1995), Bernhardt, Robertson, and Farrow (1994) did not find evidence to support the tax-
based signaling models. Furthermore, using data from six years before and six years after the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Grullon and Michaely (2001) found that the market responded much 
more positively to dividend increases when dividend taxation was lower (after the tax change), a 
finding that is inconsistent with tax-based signaling theories. 
Amihud and Murgia (1997) examine dividend policy in Germany, where dividends are 
not tax disadvantaged and in fact dividend taxation is lower than capital gains taxation for most 
classes of investors. In this setting, the tax-based models (such as John and Williams, 1995, 
Bernheim, 1991, and Allen Bernardo and Welch, 2000) predict that dividend changes should not 
have any informational value. Thus, we should not observe a price reaction around changes in 
dividends. However, Amihud and Murgia (1997) find that dividend changes in Germany 
generated a stock price reaction that was very similar to what other researchers have found in the 
U.S. This finding is not consistent with the theory. 
Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) examined the relation between changes in 
dividend policy and changes in the risk and growth characteristics of the firm. Their sample 
comprised 7,642 dividend changes announced between 1968 and 1993. Using the Fama-French 
three-factor model or the CAPM, they found that firms that increased dividends experienced a 
significant decline in their systematic risk, but firms that decreased dividends experienced a 
significant increase in systematic risk. 
  Firms that increased dividends also experienced a  
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significant decline in their return on assets, which indicates a decline in systematic risk. Capital 
expenditures of firms that increased dividends stayed the same and the levels of cash and short-
term investments on their balance sheets declined. 
Moreover, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan found that the greater the subsequent 
decline in risk, the more positive was the market reaction to the announced dividend. Thus, 
changes in risk, conditional on changes in profitability, begin to provide an explanation for the 
price reaction to dividend announcements.  
Using the Gordon growth model and the actual changes in risk and dividends, Table 11 
illustrates the relations between the risk reduction, the reduction in growth, and the price reaction 
to the announced dividend. The table shows that the average stock price prior to the 
announcement is $29.6, and the average market reaction is 1.34%, implying a post-
announcement price of $30. Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) further reported a 
decline in the equity cost of capital from an average of 13.2% in the years before the dividend 
change to 12.2% in the years after the dividend change. Now, using the Gordon growth model, 
we can calculate the implied change in growth. We find that because of the decline in risk, a 
growth rate decline of even 20% (from 9.48% to 7.48%) is still consistent with a positive market 
reaction.  
In summary, the empirical evidence provides a strong prima facie case against the 
traditional dividend signaling models. First, the relation between dividend changes and 
subsequent earnings changes are the opposite of what the theory predicts, so if firms signal, the 
signal is not about future growth in earnings or cash flows. Second, the market doesn￿t ￿get￿ the 
signal. There is a significant price drift in subsequent years. (However, there is a change in the 
dividend-changing firms￿ risk profile, and that the change is related both to the dividend and to  
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subsequent performance.) Third, a cross-sectional examination strongly indicates that it is the 
large and profitable firms and those firms with less information asymmetries that pay the vast 
majority of dividends.  
 
7.2  Agency models 
Since most agency models are not as structured as the signaling models, it is difficult to 
derive precise empirical implications. According to the free cash flow models what should 
happen to earnings after a dividend increase? The answer is ambiguous. If the board of directors 
decides to increase the dividend after management has already invested in some negative NPV 
projects, then, since the payment of dividends prevents management from continuing to invest in 
￿bad￿ projects, we should expect earnings and profitability to increase. However, if the board 
decides on dividends before management has the chance to overinvest, then it is difficult to say 
how future earnings will be relative to past earnings. If dividends increase around the time the 
firms face declines in investment opportunities, then even a decline in profitability is consistent 
with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
A clearer implication of the free cash flow hypothesis is that the overinvestment problem 
is likely to be more pronounced in stable, cash-rich companies in mature industries without many 
growth opportunities. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) exploited this feature to test the free￿cash 
flow hypothesis, and to contrast it with the information ￿signaling hypothesis. The basic idea is 
that, according to the free ￿cash flow hypothesis, an increase in dividends should have a greater 
(positive) price impact for firms that overinvest than for firms that do not. Empirically, they 
identified overinvesting firms as ones with Tobin￿s Q less than unity. When they examined  only 
dividend changes that were greater than 10% (in absolute value), they found that for dividend- 
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increase announcements, firms with Q less than one experienced a larger price appreciation than 
firms with Q greater than one. For dividend-decrease announcements, firms with Q lower than 
one showed a more dramatic price drop. The greater effect (in absolute value) of dividend 
changes on firms with lower Q is consistent with the free ￿cash flow hypothesis. On the other 
hand, the information-signaling hypothesis would have predicted a symmetric effect regardless 
of the ratio of market value to replacement value.  
Yoon and Starks (1995) repeated the Lang and Litzenberger experiment over a longer 
time period. They found that the reaction to dividend decreases was the same for high and low 
Tobin￿s ￿Q firms.  The fact that the market reacts negatively to dividend decrease 
announcements by the value-maximizing (high Q) firms is not consistent with the free-cash flow 
hypothesis.   
Like Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Yoon and Starks found a differential reaction to 
announcements of divided increases.  However, when they controlled for other factors, such as 
the level of dividend yield, firm size, and the magnitude of the change in the dividend yield 
(through a regression analysis), Yoon and Starks found a symmetric reaction to dividend changes 
(both increases and decreases) between high and low Tobin￿s Q firms. Again, this evidence is 
not consistent with the free ￿cash flow hypotheses. 
Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan￿s findings of declining return on assets, cash levels, 
and capital expenditures in the years after large dividend increases suggest that firms that 
anticipate a declining investment opportunity set are the ones that are likely to increase 
dividends.  This is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. Lie (2000) thoroughly 
investigated the relation between excess funds and firms￿ payout policies and found that 
dividend-increasing (or repurchase) firms had cash in excess of peer firms in their industry. He  
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also showed that the market reaction to the announcement of special dividends (and repurchases) 
was positively related to the firm￿s amount of excess cash and negatively related to the firm￿s 
investment opportunity set as measured by Tobin￿s Q. These results are consistent with the idea 
that limiting potential overinvestment through cash distribution, especially for firms that have 
limited investment opportunities, enhances shareholder wealth. 
Christie and Nanda (1994) examined the reaction of stocks to President Roosevelt￿s 
unexpected announcement in 1936 of taxes on undistributed corporate profits. The new tax 
increased the attractiveness of dividends relative to retained earnings. According to the free cash 
flow hypothesis, firms would now have had more incentive to reduce retained earnings and 
thereby reduce potential overinvestment problems, since it had become less expensive (in 
relative terms) to dispense of those cash flows. This effect would have been particularly 
pronounced for firms that were more susceptible to agency costs. Christie and Nanda (1994) 
found that share prices rose in response to the announcement of the tax change, consistent with 
the notion that paying dividends may alleviate some free cash flow problems. They also found 
that firms that were more likely to suffer from free cash flow problems experienced a more 
positive price reaction to the announcement. 
The ability to monitor and the rights of outside shareholders differs across countries, and 
by implication the potential severity of conflicts of interests will also differ. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) examined the relation between investors￿ protection and 
dividend policy across 33 countries. They tested two hypotheses. The first was that when 
investors were better able to monitor and enforce their objectives on management (countries with 
higher investors￿ protection), they would also pressure management to disgorge more cash. The 
second hypothesis was that because of market forces (e.g., management wants to maintain the  
 81 
ability to raise more cash in the capital markets or wants to maintain a high stock price for other 
reasons), management would actually pay high dividends in those countries where investors￿ 
protection was not high.
12  
La Porta et al. (2000) found that firms in countries with better investor protection made 
higher dividend payouts than did firms in countries with lower investor protection. Moreover, in 
countries with more legal protection, high-growth firms had lower payout ratios. This finding 
supports the idea that investors use their legal power to force dividends when growth prospects 
are low. That is, an effective legal system provides investors with the opportunity to reduce 
agency costs by forcing managers to pay out cash. There is no support for the notion that 
managers have the incentive to ￿do it on their own.￿  
The results of La Porta et al. (2000) indicate that without enforcement, management does 
not have a strong incentive to ￿convey its quality￿ through payout policy.  There is also no 
evidence that in countries with low investor protection, management will voluntarily commit 
itself to pay out higher dividends and to be monitored more frequently by the market. 
Before concluding this section we discuss the empirical evidence on the relation between 
the potential shareholder-debtholder conflict of interest and dividend policy.  
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) examined the effect of dividend-change 
announcements on both bond and equities prices. If dividend changes are driven by 
equityholders￿ desire to extract wealth from debtholders, then an increase in dividends should 
have a positive impact on stock prices (which we know it does), and a negative impact on bond 
prices. The reverse should be true for dividend decreases. The alternative hypothesis, that 
                                                 
12 The notion that in countries where investors￿ protection is low, firms would pay higher dividends is also 
consistent with many of the signaling models. In countries with low protection, the degree of asymmetric 
information is likely to be higher, and hence the desire to pay dividends by high-quality firms should be higher as 
well.  
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dividends are a consequence of asymmetric information or that they resolve free cash flow 
problems, implies that bond prices should move in the same direction as equity prices. 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay found that bond prices dropped significantly at the announcement of 
dividend decreases, and did not change significantly at dividend-increase announcements.  These 
results do not lend support to the wealth expropriation hypothesis.
13 
Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that both equityholders and 
bondholders may a priori agree on restricting dividends. Indeed, most bond covenants contain 
constraints that limit both investment- and debt-financed dividends.  
Kalay (1982b) examined these constraints and found that firms held significantly more 
cash (or cash equivalents) than the minimum they needed to hold, according to the bond 
covenants.  We can interpret Kalay￿s finding as a reverse wealth transfer. That is, if debt were 
priced under the assumption that only the minimum cash would be held by the corporation, then 
a positive reservoir would increase the market value of debt at the expense of equityholders.  
In hindsight, this is not too surprising. We should not expect that large, established firms, 
which are likely to have to come back to the well and seek more debt financing at some point in 
the future, are going to relinquish their reputation for a small gain at the expense of bondholders. 
We can readily see how a one-time wealth transfer from existing bondholders to equityholders 
may result in a long-term loss because of the increase in the cost of capital. When would the 
problem arise?  In precisely those cases where there is a great probability that the firm￿s time 
horizon is short, e.g., the firm is in financial distress, or is about to be taken private. DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1990) found evidence that was consistent with this assertion. They showed that 
firms in financial distress were reluctant to cut their dividends. In these cases, not cutting 
                                                 
13 The asymmetry in the bond price reaction may be explained by several factors. Among them is the fact that 
dividend decreases are larger in absolute value than dividend increases, and therefore have a more significant  
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dividends may constitute a significant wealth transfer from debtholders to equityholders. This is 
still an open question that is worth further consideration.
14 
 
8.  Transaction Costs and Other Explanations 
  Under certain circumstances, it is possible that investors would prefer dividends despite 
the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains.  
  The first explanation of why firms pay dividends has to do with the  ￿prudent man￿ laws. 
These laws and regulation are intended to protect small investors from agents (pension funds, for 
example) that do not invest in their interest. Private trusts, acting under the Prudent Man 
Investment Act, are the most constrained fiduciaries. Pension funds are governed by the ERISA, 
which is less restrictive than the Prudent Man Rule. Lastly, mutual funds are supervised by the 
SEC according to the Investment Company Act of 1940, which is less restrictive than either the 
common law (for bank trusts) or ERISA (for pension funds). (See Del Guercio, 1996, for 
information about the various laws and regulation described here). 
  Del Guercio (1996) presented evidence indicating that the Prudent Man Rule affects 
investment decisions. Bank managers significantly tilt the composition of their portfolios that are 
viewed by the courts as being subject to the Prudent Man Rule.  Mutual funds do not. Bank trusts 
weight their portfolios towards S&P stocks and towards stocks that are ranked A+ (the highest 
ranking based on earnings and dividend history).  Mutual funds load their portfolios the other 
way, towards lower rank stocks. We find it interesting that there is no difference between the 
portfolios￿ composition of bank trusts (mainly trusts of wealthy individuals, which are highly 
                                                                                                                                                             
impact on both bond and stock prices. 
14 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) allude to another link between conflict of interest and dividend policy. They 
report that some dividend reductions are intended to enhance the firm￿s bargaining position regarding labor 
negotiations.  
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taxed) and bank pension funds (nontaxable entities). Both types of portfolio are weighted more 
towards S&P stocks and on stocks that are ranked A+.  
  Del Guercio went a step further.  Using a regression analysis, she examined the role of 
dividends in the portfolio selection of institutions and found that after controlling for several 
other factors, such as market capitalization, liquidity, risk, and S&P ranking, dividend yield had 
no power to explain banks￿ portfolio choices, and had negative explanatory power in mutual 
funds portfolio choice. 
  Overall, the evidence indicates that the Prudent Man Rule has a role in portfolio 
selection, but that dividends do not play a major role (if any). This evidence is also consistent 
with the information presented in Table 2, which indicates that dividend taxation is not an issue 
in portfolio selection, not even for highly taxed investors.  
  A second motive for paying dividends is based on a transaction costs argument.  If 
investors want a steady flow of income from their capital investment (say, for consumption 
reasons), then it is possible that dividend payments would be the cheapest way to achieve this 
goal.  This result may hold if the cost of the alternative (i.e., to sell a portion of the holdings and 
receive capital gains) involves nontrivial costs.  These costs might  be the actual transaction costs 
for selling the shares, which can be quite high for retail investors, or they could represent the 
time and effort spent on these transactions. 
  However, this argument does not seem to be supported by the time-series evidence on 
transaction costs, nor by  stock ownership. First, through the years, and especially after the 
switch to negotiated commissions in May 1975, the transaction costs of buying and selling shares 
have been substantially reduced. This reduction should have resulted in lower demand for 
dividends, as the alternative became cheaper. The evidence in Table 1, does not support this 
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prediction. We do not observe a reduction in dividend payments that is related to the change in 
transaction costs. 
   Second, this argument particularly applies to individual small investors who do not hold 
many shares.  Hence, the cost of transacting may be higher. But the role of small investors in the 
market place has been shrinking. The overall level of dividends in the economy has not been 
reduced accordingly.  
  Third, if this effect is in fact substantial, it should lead to an optimal dividend policy at 
the aggregate level. However, As Black and Scholes (1974) argued, firms will adjust their 
dividend policy such that the demand for dividends by this clientele is fulfilled.  Thus, in 
equilibrium, any specific firm should be indifferent to dividend policy.  So, while this 
explanation can account for positive payouts despite the adverse tax consequences, it cannot 
explain why, in equilibrium, firms care about the level of dividends paid.  
  Shefrin and Statman (1984) suggested a third explanation as to why investors may prefer 
dividend-paying stocks.  Rather than developing an economic model based on maximizing 
behavior, they eliminated the maximizing assumptions that are the cornerstone of neoclassical 
economics, and which we have maintained throughout.  Instead, Shefrin and Statman developed 
a theory of dividends based on several recent theories of investors￿ behavior.  The basic idea is 
that even if the eventual cash received is the same, there is a significant difference in whether it 
comes in the form of dividends or as share repurchases.  In other words, the form of cash flow is 
important for psychological reasons. 
  We illustrate Shefrin and Statman￿s approach with one of the theories they develop, 
based on Thaler and Shefrin￿s (1981) theory of self-control. Thaler and Shefrin suggested that 
people have difficulties behaving rationally when they want to do something but have problems  
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doing so.  Examples that illustrate this suggestion are the prevalence of smoking clinics, credit 
counselors, diet clubs, and substance abuse groups. Individuals wish to deny themselves a 
present indulgence, but find that they yield to temptation.  Thaler and Shefrin represented this 
conflict in a principal-agent form.  The principal is the individual￿s internal planner, which 
expresses consistent long-run preferences.  However, the responsibility for carrying out the 
individual￿s action lies not with the planner, but with the doer, the agent. 
  There are two ways the planner can control the agent.  The first is will power.  The 
problem is that this causes disutility.  The second is to avoid situations in which will power must 
be used.  This avoidance is accomplished by adopting rules of behavior that make it unnecessary 
for people to question what they are doing most of the time.  
  Shefrin and Statman suggested that by having money in the form of dividends rather than 
capital gains, people avoid having to make decisions about how much to consume.  Thus, they 
avoid letting the agent in them behave opportunistically.  They postulated that the benefit of 
doing this was sufficient to offset the taxes on dividends.  
  As with the transaction costs story, the self-control explanation can account for an 
aggregate positive payout policy, but not for an individual firm optimal payout policy.  That is, 
in equilibrium, firms will adjust their dividend policy such that the marginal firm is indifferent to 
the level of dividend paid out.  Thus, neither the transaction costs explanation nor the behavioral 
explanation can account for the positive price reaction to dividend increases and the negative 
price reaction to dividend decreases. Nevertheless, this explanation is innovative and intriguing.  
  We also note that this explanation relies heavily on the effect that individual investors 
have on market prices.  The need for a steady stream of cash flows combined with significant 
transaction costs (the transaction costs story) may adequately describe the actions of small retail  
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investors, but may not hold when applied to corporate and institutional investors.  Likewise, 
using self-control as an explanation for why firms pay dividends is more persuasive when 
individual investors are the dominant force in the marketplace.  As the evidence in Table 1 
indicates, the level of dividend payout did not decrease through time.  This evidence does not 
support  the self-control and transaction costs explanations.  
  However, Long￿s (1978) study of Citizens Utilities (CU) is illuminating.  CU stocks are 
an almost perfect medium for examining the effect of dividend policy on prices.  The reason is 
that from 1955 until 1989, this company had  two types of common stocks that differed only in 
their dividend policy.  Series A stock paid a stock dividend and Series B stock paid a cash 
dividend.
15  The company￿s charter required that the stock dividend on Series A stock be of equal 
value with Series B cash dividends. However, in practice, the board of directors  chose stock 
dividends that averaged 10% higher than the cash dividends.  Even without taxes, we would 
expect the price ratio of Series A stock to Series B stock to be equal to the dividend ratio, i.e., to 
1.1.  Long found that the price ratio was consistently below 1.1 in the period considered.  This 
price ratio implies a preference for cash dividends over stock dividends despite the tax penalty. 
  Poterba (1986) revisited the Citizens Utilities case.  For the period 1976-84, he found that 
the price ratio and the dividend ratios were comparable:  the average price ratio was 1.134 and 
the average dividend ratio was 1.122. This evidence implies indifference between dividend and 
capital gains income.  Poterba also examined the ex-dividend day behavior of CU for the period 
1965-84, and found that the average ex-day price decline was less than the dividend payment.  
                                                 
15 CU received a special IRS ruling so that for tax purposes, the Series A stock dividends would be taxed in the same 
way as proportionate stock dividends are treated for firms having only one series of common stock outstanding.  The 
special ruling expired in 1990.  
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This evidence supports the ex-dividend day studies discussed previously.  It is hard to reconcile 
the ex-day evidence of the CU stocks with the relative prices of the two stocks on ordinary days.  
Hubbard and Michaely (1997) examined the relative prices of these two stocks after the 
passage of the 1986 TRA.  Because the 1986 TRA substantially reduced the advantage of 
receiving stock dividends rather than cash dividends, they hypothesized that the price ratio 
should decrease.  Indeed, they found that during 1986, the price ratio was considerably lower 
than in the previous years.  However, in the years 1987 through 1989, the price ratio rose and 
stayed consistently above the dividend ratio. 
It seems that the evidence from the price behavior of Citizens Utilities deepens the 
dividend mystery, rather than enlightening us.  It is difficult to know just how to interpret it. 
There is another rationale for paying dividends, but it is not consistent with efficient 
markets.  If managers know more about their firm than the market does and they can time their 
equity issues decisions to periods when their firm is highly overvalued, then a positive payout is 
optimal.  That is, if investors prefer constant cash flow and managers can sell additional equity 
when it is overvalued, then investors will be better off receiving a steady stream of dividends and 
leaving the timing of the sales to the firm.  However, in efficient markets, outside investors will 
realize that when a firm sells its securities, it implies that the firm is overvalued (see Myers and 
Majluf, 1984, for example), and its price (post announcement) will reflect this fact.  In such a 
case, current equityholders are not better off, even if the managers know more about the firm￿s 
value than the market does.  The attempt to raise equity will result in a reduction in the existing 
equity￿s value. The new shares will be sold at fair value, which renders dividend policy 
irrelevant.   
 89 
A growing number of studies are presenting evidence that is not consistent with the 
market rationality described above. Their evidence is consistent with the notion that managers 
can time the market (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2000); and that the market underreacts to some 
financial policy decisions, such as seasoned equity issues (Loughran and Ritter, 1995), Initial 
Public Offerings (Ritter 1991 and Michaely and Shaw, 1994), and repurchases (Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995).  We know that announcements of seasoned equity issues are 
associated with a price decline (e.g., Masulis and Korwar, 1986), and share repurchases 
announcements are associated with price increases (e.g., Vermaelen, 1981).  However, these 
studies go further by showing that a significant price movement in the same direction continues 
several years after the event.  
Moreover, the post-dividend announcement drift (Charest, 1978; Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack, 1995; Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler, 1997) may be a result of investor behavior that is 
less ￿than ￿fully rational. This drift can be explained to some extent by the fact that dividend 
changes indicate changes in the denominator (risk profile) rather than in the numerator (cash 
flows), and thus are harder to detect.  Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2000) find that the 
long-term drift is negatively related to future changes in risk. The greater the decline in risk, the 
larger the drift.  Thus, in the long run, prices increase with a decline in risk.  This price behavior 
indicates a securities market in which investors only gradually learn the full implications of a 
dividend change for a firm￿s future profitability and systematic risk. Hence, we could argue that 
paying dividends is the optimal policy so that investors do not have to sell their stock when it is 
below its (true?) market value. 
The literature on dividend policy is plentiful.  Due to a lack of space, we cannot cover the 
many contributions in detail.  However, one approach that has received considerable attention in  
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the economics literature, but not in the finance literature, was developed by King (1977), 
Auerbach (1979), and Bradford (1981).  The assumption in this framework is that the prohibition 
on repurchasing shares is binding, and paying dividends is the only way firms can distribute cash 
to investors.  The market value of corporate assets is therefore equal to the present value of the 
after-tax dividends firms are expected to pay.  Because dividend taxes are capitalized into share 
values, firms are indifferent on the margin between policies of retaining earnings or paying 
dividends.  Thus, the model supports the idea that firms pay out a significant portion of corporate 
earnings as dividends.  However, this theory fails to explain the market reaction to dividend 
announcements that was the starting point of many of the other theories. This theory has also not 
received much attention in the finance literature because of its assumption that dividends are the 
only way the firm can pay out money to shareholders.
16 
This assumption is appropriate in some countries, such as the U.K., where repurchases 
have historically been illegal.  It is less appropriate for the U.S.  Nonetheless, the use of open-
market share repurchases in the U.S. was not common until 1983, perhaps because of some legal 
restrictions. For example, the risk of violating the antimanipulative provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934 deterred most corporations from repurchasing shares. After the 
SEC adopted a safe￿harbor rule (Rule 10b-18) in 1982 that guaranteed that, under certain 
conditions, the SEC would not file manipulation charges against companies that repurchased 
shares on the open market, repurchase activity experienced an upward structural shift.  
 
9. Repurchases 
                                                 
16 Some models have been criticized on the grounds that they implicitly assume that dividends cannot be financed by 
equity or debt issues.  See Hasbrouck and Friend (1984) and Sarig (1984).  
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Today, repurchases represent a significant portion of total U.S. corporate payouts (Figure 
1). In the last several years, the dollar amount of repurchases has been virtually equal to that of 
cash dividends. Not only has the amount of repurchases increased, but also the number of firms 
that repurchase has increased dramatically.  
The phenomenon of the decline in the number of firms that pay dividends (Fama and 
French, 2001 and Grullon and Michaely, 2002) might be directly related to the trend we see in 
repurchases. These trends represent a significant departure from historical patterns in repurchase 
and dividend policies of corporations.  
 
9.1  The mechanics and some stylized facts 
Firms repurchase their shares through three main vehicles: (1) open-market share 
repurchase, (2) fixed-price tender offer, and (3) Dutch auction. Repurchased shares can either be 
retired or be counted as part of the firm￿s treasury stock. In any case, those shares lose their 
voting rights and rights to cash flows. 
In an open-market share repurchase, the firm buys back some of its shares in the open 
market.  Historically, regulatory bodies in many countries frowned on this practice, since it 
might make it possible for corporations to manipulate the price of their shares.  Indeed, there are 
still many countries where share repurchases are not allowed and many other countries, such as 
Japan and Germany, that have only recently relaxed the restrictions on repurchases.  
In the U.S., share repurchase activity is governed by the antimanipulative provisions of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These provisions exposed repurchasing firms (and anyone 
else involved in the repurchase activity, such as investment banks) to the possibility of triggering 
an SEC investigation and being charged with illegal market manipulation. This risk seemed to  
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deter firms from purchasing their shares. Conscious of this problem, the SEC started to design 
guidelines for corporations on how to carry out share repurchase programs without raising 
suspicions of manipulative behavior.  As part of the deregulation wave of the early 1980s, the 
SEC approved a legislation to regulate open market share repurchases.  In 1982, the SEC 
adopted Rule 10b-18, which provides a safe-harbor for repurchasing firms against the anti-
manipulative provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
17  Specifically, Rule 10b-18 was 
adopted in order to establish guidelines for repurchasing shares on the open market without 
violating Sections 9 (a) (2) or 10 (b) of the SEA of 1934.
18  In general, Rule 10b-18 requires that 
firms repurchasing shares on the open market should publicly announce the repurchase program, 
only use one broker or dealer on any single day, avoid trading on an up tick or during the last 
half-hour before the closing of the market, and limit the daily volume of purchases to a specified 
amount.  
In a fixed-price tender offer, the corporation, through an investment bank, offers to 
purchase a portion of its share at a prespecified price. The tender offer includes the number of 
shares sought and the duration of the offer. However, the firm usually reserves the right to 
increase the number of shares repurchased if the tender offer is oversubscribed, and/or to buy 
shares from the tendering shareholders on a pro-rata basis. If the offer is not fully subscribed, the 
company has the right to either buy the shares tendered or to cancel the offer altogether.  
In a Dutch auction, the firm specifies the number of shares to be purchased and the price 
range for the repurchase. Each interested shareholder submits a proposal containing a price and 
                                                 
17 47 Fed Reg. 53333 (November 26, 1982). 
18 Section 9 (a) (2) establishes that it will be illegal ￿￿ to effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of 
transactions in any security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading in 
such security, or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of 
such securities by others.￿ Section 10 (b) establishes that it will be unlawful  ￿￿ to use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, any manipulative or deceptive or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the  
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the number of shares to be tendered. The firm aggregates all the offers and finds the minimum 
price at which it can buy the prespecified number of shares. This price is paid to all tendering 
shareholders, even if they submitted a lower price. 
Table 12 shows that open market repurchases are by far the most popular method of 
repurchase. For example, in 1998 open market repurchases accounted for over 95% of the dollar 
value of shares repurchased. The relative importance of Dutch auctions and tender offers, was 
significantly higher in the 1980s. The introduction of Rule 10b-18 and the consequent rise in the 
popularity of open market share repurchases have made the other methods much less important. 
Therefore, in this section we concentrate on open market share repurchases.
19  
In practice, fixed-price tender offers and Dutch auctions are likely to be used when a 
corporation wishes to tender a large amount of its outstanding shares in a short period of time, 
typically around 15% (see for example Vermaelen, 1981, Comment and Jarrell, 1991 and 
Bagwell, 1992). The duration of such programs is usually about one month. Open market 
repurchases are often used to repurchase smaller portions of outstanding shares, with firms 
repurchasing an average of 6% of the shares (Ikenberry Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995, 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002). The duration of open market repurchases is much longer. Stephens 
and Weisbach (1998) report that firms complete their open market repurchase program in about 
three years. 
The average announcement price effect of an open market share repurchase program is 
around 3% and the market reaction is positively related to the portion of shares outstanding 
sought (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995, Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Vermaelen 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.￿ 
19 Another type of share repurchase is a targeted stock repurchase, in which the firm offers to buy stocks from a 
subset of shareholders. For example, a ￿greenmail agreement￿ is a type of targeted stock repurchase from (usually) 
one large shareholder. Greenmail is typically used in conjunction with takeover threats and is used to a much lesser  
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(1981) and Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, (1995) report a decrease in stock price that is 
similar in magnitude in the month prior to the announcement. Comment and Jarrell (1991) report 
an abnormal price reaction of around 12% for fixed-price offers and around 8% for Dutch 
auction repurchases. 
Using more than 1,200 open market repurchases announced between 1980 and 1990, 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) investigated the long-term performance of 
repurchasing stocks in the four-year repurchase period. They found that repurchasing firms￿ 
stock outperformed the market by an average of about 12% over the four-year period. They were 
particularly interested to find that  most of the drift was concentrated in ￿value￿ stocks (high 
book-to-market stocks). Those stocks exhibited an abnormal return of 45% in the four years 
following the repurchase announcement!  
 
9.2  Theories of repurchases 
The positive market reaction to repurchase announcements, and the fact that just like 
dividends, the firms pay out cash, makes it easier to see why many of the dividend theories apply 
to repurchases as well.  For example, we can seamlessly apply  the Miller and Rock (1985) or the 
Bhattacharya (1979) signaling models to repurchases. At the cost of shaving investments firms 
pay out cash to signal quality (Miller and Rock) or the need for external costly financing 
(Bhattacharya). The free cash flow models can also work as easily with repurchases as with 
dividends. Models that are based on relative taxation (such as John and Williams, 1985 or Allen, 
Bernardo and Welch, 2000)  or those studies that posit that dividends are a better signaling 
device do not assume (or imply) that repurchases and dividends are perfect substitutes.  
                                                                                                                                                             
extent than those described above.  
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Before turning our attention to the substitutability of dividends and repurchases, we 
review some of the work that explains why firms repurchase their shares in isolation.  
Vermaelen (1984) used a standard signaling model in which managers were more 
informed than outside investors about future profitability.  He showed that repurchasing shares 
could be used as a credible signal to convey this information. It is costly for bad firms to mimic 
because managers hold a portion of the firm and do not tender. Thus, if the firm buys overpriced 
shares and managers do not participate, the value of their fractional share decreases. Vermaelen￿s 
study also explains why the market reaction increases with the portion of shares sought as it 
increases the credibility of the signal. 
Another oft-mentioned reason for buybacks relates to takeover battles. By buying back 
stocks from investors who value them the least, the firm makes any potential takeover more 
expensive by increasing the price the acquirer will have to pay to gain control (Bagwell, 1991, 
Stulz, 1988). The larger the fractional ownership controlled by the management, the higher the 
likely premium in case of a takeover. This motive might play a role in fixed-price tender offers 
and Dutch auctions, in which firms repurchase a large fraction of shares over a short  period. 
Although important in their own right, these types of repurchase represent a very small fraction 
(see Table 12) relative to open market repurchases. They do not appear to be a major factor from 
an overall payout policy perspective.  
Repurchases can also reduce the free cash flow problem and mitigate conflicts of interest 
between outside shareholders and management. If a firm has too much cash (beyond what it can 
invest in positive NPV projects), then repurchasing its shares is a fast and tax-effective way to 
give the cash back to its shareholders. Moreover, buying back shares (and assuming management 
has some equity, either in stocks or through stock options) increases the relative ownership of  
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management and decreases potential conflicts of interest by better aligning management interests 
with outside shareholders￿ interests (as in Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
9.3  Repurchases compared to dividends 
Since dividend distributions are associated with a heavier tax burden, why not signal or 
resolve agency problems only through repurchases? One answer is institutional constraints. As 
we noted earlier,  in many countries repurchases were prohibited. In the U.S., they were limited 
because of regulations that subjected the firm to manipulation charges. Nevertheless, open 
market repurchases were done prior to 1983, before the introduction of Rule 10b-18 (though on a 
much smaller scale), and dividends continue to be a major vehicle to distribute cash even now, 
nearly 20 years after the implementation of Rule 10b-18. Some researchers have argued that if 
firms were to start repurchasing shares on a regular basis, they would be challenged by the IRS.  
This is another institutional constraint, but to the best of our knowledge this has not happened 
yet. We are not aware of any case in which the IRS has taxed a repurchase as ordinary income on 
the grounds that it is a dividend in disguise, despite the fact that a significant number of firms 
repurchase on a regular basis. Therefore, institutional constraints cannot be the entire story. 
Several researchers have attempted to explain this puzzle from a theoretical perspective. 
Ofer and Thakor (1987) presented a model in which firms could signal their value through two 
mechanisms, paying dividends or repurchasing their shares. There are two type of costs 
associated with these signals. First, by paying out cash, firms expose themselves to the 
possibility of having to resort to outside financing, which is more expensive than generating 
internal capital. Whether a firm pays dividends or repurchases its shares, it will be subject to this 
cost because these actions deplete its internal capital. The second cost, which is unique to  
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repurchases, is that relative to dividends, repurchases reduce managers￿ risk. If a firm pays 
dividends, which are prorated, the manager has a portion of his wealth in cash. In the case of 
repurchases, since she typically does not tender her shares, her portfolio is riskier.  Thus, the 
signaling costs through repurchases are higher. It immediately follows that if future prospects of 
the firms are much higher than perceived by the market, then the managers will use repurchases. 
If the discrepancy is not that severe, managers will use dividends. In other words, repurchases 
are a stronger signal. 
Barclay and Smith (1988) and Brennan and Thakor (1990) provided a different 
explanation as to why so many firms rely so heavily on dividends rather than repurchases. The 
crux of their arguments is that a portion of the firm￿s cost of capital is a function of the adverse 
selection costs (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O￿Hara 2002). 
When a firm announces a repurchase program, the cost to the uninformed investors of adverse 
selection increases. When some shareholders are better informed than others about the prospects 
of the firm, they will be able to take advantage of this information. They will bid for stock when 
it is worth more than the tender price, but will not bid when it is worth less.  Uninformed buyers 
will receive only a portion of their order when the stock is undervalued, but will receive the 
entire amount when it is overvalued.  This adverse selection means that they are at a 
disadvantage in a share repurchase.  When money is paid out in the form of dividends, the 
informed and the uninformed receive a pro rata amount, so there is no adverse selection.  As a 
result, uninformed shareholders prefer dividends to repurchases. Further, this preference will 
persist even if dividends are taxed more heavily than repurchases, provided the tax disadvantage 
is not too large.  On the other hand, the informed will prefer repurchases because this allows 
them to profit at the expense of the uninformed.    
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Brennan and Thakor (1990) argue that the method of disbursement chosen by firms will 
be determined by a majority vote of the shareholders.  If the uninformed have more votes than 
the informed, firms will use dividends, but if the informed predominate, firms will choose 
repurchases.  When there is a fixed cost of obtaining information, the number of informed 
depends on the distribution of shareholdings and the amount paid out.  For a given payout, 
investors with large holdings will have an incentive to become informed.  When a small amount 
is paid out, only the investors with the largest holdings will become informed; most shareholders 
will remain uninformed and will prefer dividends.  When a larger amount is paid out, more 
shareholders become informed, so the firm may choose repurchases.   
We note that this model has exactly the opposite prediction to Allen, Bernardo and Welch 
(2000) on the relation between large (and presumably informed) shareholders and payout policy. 
In this model, larger shareholders favor repurchases. In Allen et al., large shareholders prefer 
dividends. It is still an open question as to which one of these predictions holds empirically. 
The Brennan and Thakor model is an intriguing explanation of the preference that firms 
appear to have for dividends.  It answers the question of why firms prefer to use dividends even 
though dividends are taxed more heavily.  Unlike the John and Williams￿ theory, the Brennan 
and Thankor model supports the idea that dividends are smoothed.  
However, their model is not above criticism. First, the range of tax rates for which 
dividends are preferred to repurchases because of adverse selection is usually small. To explain 
the predominance of dividends, we must use another argument that relies on shareholders being 
homogeneous.  For tax rates above the level at which adverse selection can explain the 
preference for dividends, everybody will tender in a repurchase, so it will be pro rata.  But this 
universal tendering  clearly does not occur. Second, if superior information is the motive for  
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repurchases, it is surprising that management almost never tenders its shares. Presumably, they 
are the ones with the best information.  Another criticism is that if adverse selection were a 
serious problem, firms could gather the relevant information and publicly announce it.  
Nevertheless, Brennan and Thakor￿s theory sheds new light on the choice between dividends and 
repurchases. 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1994) and Lucas and McDonald (1998) also considered models in 
which there is a tax disadvantage to dividends and an adverse selection cost to repurchases. In 
their models, managers are better informed than are shareholders. Their models show how 
payout policy depends on whether managers think the firm is over- or undervalued relative to the 
current market valuation. Both models provide interesting insights into the advantages and 
disadvantages of dividends and repurchases. However, the stability and smoothing of dividends 
is difficult to explain in this framework unless firms remain undervalued or overvalued relative 
to their market value through time.  
 
9.4 Empirical evidence 
The market usually reacts positively to an announcement of any type of share repurchase. 
The extent of the reaction is positively related to the size of the repurchase program and 
negatively related to the market value of the firm. Despite the positive reaction, many studies 
have found that the market does not comprehend the full extent of the information contained in 
the announcement, given the long-term post-announcement drift. The drift is particularly 
pronounced in high book-to-market stocks (for open market share repurchases, see Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995). Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991), Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, (1995), and others document a negative abnormal return in the  
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months leading to the (open market) repurchase announcement, a finding that suggests that firms 
time the repurchase announcement to when the stock is more undervalued. 
A subtler issue concerns the number of shares that have actually been repurchased and 
the duration of the program. A firm is under no obligation to repurchase all of the shares it seeks. 
The announcement merely serves to inform investors of its intentions. If there is a significant 
discrepancy between the announced and the actual number of shares repurchased, this 
discrepancy can affect the long-term reaction in the years after the announcement. Just as 
important, when we wish to examine the relation between repurchases and other types of payout 
such as dividends, or to relate actual repurchases to performance, we must measure the actual 
repurchases as accurately as possible.  
 
9.4.1  How to measure share repurchase activity? 
Using 450 open market repurchase programs announced between 1981 and 1990, 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) suggest several measures of repurchases.  
(1) The change in number of shares outstanding as reported on the CRSP or Compustat 
databases.  
  A potential problem with this measure is that if a firm repurchases shares and 
simultaneously distributes shares (either to the public or to employees), this measure will 
understate the actual amount of repurchase. 
(2) The net dollar spent on repurchases as reported in the firm￿s cash flow statement. 
  If we want to analyze the dollar amount spent on repurchases, this measure is probably 
the best one to use. If we wish to compute the number of shares repurchased, we must convert 
the dollar number that is reported in the cash flow statement to number of stocks repurchased.  
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However, doing so creates a difficulty, since we do not know the purchase price. We can use the 
average trading price over the period as a proxy for the purchase price.  Another possible 
shortcoming of this measure is that it includes purchases of not only common stocks, but also 
other type of stocks such as preferred stocks. However, repurchases of securities other than 
common stocks represent only a very small portion of firms￿ repurchase activity.  
(3)  The change in Treasury stock (also reported on Compustat).  
  However, this measure can be problematic, since firms often retire the shares they 
repurchase. Thus, while the number of shares outstanding decreases, the number of Treasury 
shares does not change. In addition, if a firm repurchases shares and at the same time distributes 
shares, say in lieu of stock options, there is no change in Treasury stock, despite the repurchase 
activity. This factor may represent a significant problem, given the recent popularity of stock 
options as a method of compensation.    
  For example, imagine a firm that repurchases 1,000 shares, say for $10,000, and then a 
few months later turns around and give these shares to its CEO as part of her compensation. The 
firm is involved in two distinct actions. The first is a financing action (repurchasing shares), and 
the second is an investment decision (paying the manager). If we try to analyze the impact of a 
financing decision, holding all else constant, especially holding investment constant, this 
measure of repurchase is inadequate.  
The problem is even more severe if we try to compare repurchases and dividend 
decisions.  Say, our firm pays a total dividend of $10,000, instead of repurchasing its shares. At 
the same time, it also issues shares and gives them to the manager. In the first case (when the 
firm repurchases its shares in the open market and the researcher is using Treasury shares to 
measure repurchases), we would record no repurchase activity. But in the second case (pay a  
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dividend and issue shares), we would record a $10,000 dividend. But in reality, assuming away 
taxes, both routes are exactly identical. Our firm pays $10,000 to shareholders and gives $10,000 
worth of stock to the manager.  
In summary, measuring repurchases through the change in Treasury stock is likely to 
yield the most biased measure of repurchases. It can bundle investment and financing decisions 
(as discussed above), it combines other overlapping distributions, and it does not account for the 
fact that many firms retire the stocks they repurchase rather than putting them into Treasury 
stock  
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that this measure is substantially different from the 
other measures they use. They show that the first two measures yield similar results in the 
measurement of share repurchases, while the Treasury stock method yields estimates that are 
lower than the other two methods by about 60%.  
Which method should we use? We recommend using the cash flow spent on repurchases, 
and trying to account for any changes in the shares outstanding. This measure is likely to yield 
the least biased estimate of the actual dollar amount spent on repurchases. 
Given these measures of actual repurchases, we can address the issue of how long it takes 
firms to complete their announced stock repurchase program. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
reported that approximately 82% of the programs were completed within three years. More than 
half of the firms completed their announced repurchase program, but one tenth of the firms 
repurchased less than 5% of their announced intentions. The authors also showed that the initial 
market reaction to share repurchases was positively related to the actual share repurchase activity 
in the two years after the announcement. Firms that repurchased more experienced a larger  
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positive price effect at the announcement. However, the announcement effect was not related to 
the announced quantity of share repurchase. 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) also showed that the actual amount of repurchase in a 
given quarter was related to the firm￿s cash flow level. Using a Tobit model, they showed that 
the decision to repurchase was positively related to both the level of expected cash and 
unexpected cash. They also showed that the  actual repurchase activity was negatively related to 
the equity return in the previous quarter: the more negative the return was in quarter t-1, the more 
likely the firm was to engage in repurchase activity in quarter t. 
 
9.4.2  Empirical tests of repurchase theories 
So repurchases are positively greeted by the market, they are preceded by bad 
performance, and some (mainly value stocks) are followed by positive abnormal price 
performance.  All of these attributes are consistent with both the asymmetric 
information/signaling and the free cash flow theories as the main motive behind the decision to 
repurchase. But, as with dividends, there are two possibilities.  The positive price impact of the 
announcement can be because repurchases are good news (i.e., they lead to better investment 
decisions because management has less cash to squander), or repurchases can convey good news 
(i.e., they do not change investment decisions, but they merely convey that the firm￿s future 
growth in cash flows are under-valued).  The negative price performance in the months before 
the announcement and the positive price performance in the years after also support both 
explanations.  The stock price might have increased either because the market did not 
comprehend the full extent of the undervaluation, or because it did not incorporate the extent of 
the better investment decisions by management after the repurchase.  
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Thus, to determine the dominant force behind the decision to repurchase, we must look 
elsewhere. We begin with Vermaelen (1981). Using a number of fixed-price tender offers over 
the period 1962-1977, Vermaelen documented a significant increase in earnings per share in the 
years following fixed-price repurchases. Using 122 observations from a similar period, Dann, 
Masulis and Mayers (1991) confirmed Vermaelen￿s findings. They also showed that the initial 
market reaction was positively related to subsequent increases in earnings. Although a decline in 
cash flows (or earnings) in the years after fixed-price tender offers will lead to a rejection of the 
information/signaling hypothesis, these studies found that an increase in earnings was consistent 
with the information/signaling hypothesis.  
However, in a detailed investigation of 242 fixed price tender offers, Nohel and Tarhan 
(1998) showed that the entire improvement in earnings documented in previous studies could be 
attributed to firms with high book-to-market. That is, to low-growth value firms. Furthermore, 
they showed that firms involved in tender offers did not increase their capital expenditure, and in 
fact that the improvement in operating performance of the high book-to-market firms was 
positively related to asset sales. This finding was inconsistent with the signaling model.  They 
interpreted their evidence as supporting the notion that  fixed-price tender offers, and the market 
reaction to them, is motivated by free cash flow considerations rather then signaling.  
The earnings pattern after open-market share repurchases shows an even more consistent 
lack of improvement than those after fixed-price tender offers. Grullon and Michaely (2000) 
examined a comprehensive sample of 2735 open market share repurchases in the period 1980-
2000. They reported a decline in the level of profitability (measured by ROA) in the three years 
after the year in which the repurchase was announced.
20  They also reported a decline in capital 
                                                 
20 Using a sample of 185 open market share repurchases over the period 1978-1986, Bartov (1991) reported mixed 
results on the relation between earnings changes and repurchases. In the year after the open market repurchase, those  
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expenditures and cash reserves for those firms. (Using a different sample, Jaganathan and 
Stephens, 2001, reach similar conclusions). Overall, it seems that earnings performance 
subsequent to open-market repurchase programs and earnings performance after large changes in 
dividends have a very similar pattern.  
The risk profile of firms changes in conjunction with open market share repurchases-- 
just as it changes after dividend increases. Grullon and Michaely (2000) found that beta declined 
in the year after the announcement. The cost of capital in the three years after open market 
repurchases declined significantly from an average of 16.3% before the repurchase to 13.7% 
after.
21 
The evidence of declining earnings,  a reduction in capital expenditures and cash 
reserves, and a decline in risk is not consistent with the traditional signaling stories. It is 
consistent with the notion that when investment opportunities shrink and there is less need for 
capital expenditures in the future, firms increase their payout to shareholders, either through 
dividends or through open market share repurchases. Thus, when a firm is in a different stage of 
its life cycle, its investment ￿opportunities change, and consequently its risk ￿profile and need 
for cash changes as well. This change in turn affects it payout policy, because it increases 
dividends, repurchases or both. (It is still an open question what determines the form of payout a 
firm chooses to use.)  
Some of the evidence in Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)
22 also supports 
this notion. They reported that the largest price appreciation in the years after the repurchase 
                                                                                                                                                             
firms￿ earnings were significantly worse then the control sample. In the year after that, they were significantly 
better. These mixed results might be attributable to the small sample size. 
21 Other studies found a similar phenomenon with fixed-price tender offers. See Dann, Masulis and Mayers (1991), 
Hertzel and Jain (1991) and Nohel and Tarhan (1998). These studies showed that the market reaction to the offer is 
positively related to the subsequent decline in risk. 
22 Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) reported similar results for Canadian open market repurchases.  
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occurred for those firms that were most likely to benefit from disposing of cash. Those firms 
with high book-to-market ratio were the firms that had less need for future capital expenditure 
and were more likely to encounter free cash flow problems. 
This is not to say that perceived undervaluation does not play a role at least in the timing 
of the repurchase programs. Many of the studies cited above show that there is a clear tendency 
for firms to repurchase shares after a decline in stock price, which suggests that management 
repurchases shares when they think the stock is undervalued. An extreme example is the heavy 
wave of share repurchases immediately after the stock market crash of October 1987.  
In addition, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000) provided evidence that in 
value stocks and small cap stocks, management bought more shares when the price dropped and 
fewer shares when the price rose. What is clear from their evidence is that this undervaluation is 
not related to future earnings growth. It may happen because of changes in the risk profile of the 
firm that are not impounded in market price. It might be that for value stocks that have not 
performed well in the past, investors are more reluctant to believe that these firms will turn 
around, cut capital expenditure, reduce the amount of cash reserves, and reap the benefits of 
reductions in free cash flows. Hence, ex ￿post, those stocks outperform their peers when 
information about the realization of these issues starts to appear in the market place.  
Miller and McConnell (1995) studied adverse selection as a motive for repurchases by 
examining one of the direct implications of Barclay and Smith￿s (1988) conjecture and the 
Brennan and Thakor (1990) model. These theories argued that corporations relied on dividends 
rather than repurchases because of adverse selection problems. When a firm announces a share 
repurchase program, the uninformed market participants, particularly the market makers, should 
assume that they are more likely to trade with informed traders. Hence, in response to this signal,  
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the bid-ask spread should widen. Using daily closing quotes around 152 open market share 
repurchase programs, Miller and McConnell found no evidence of an increase in bid-ask spread 
that  they could associate with repurchases. There was no evidence that firms were deterred from 
engaging in open market share repurchase programs because of the adverse effect of such 
programs on market liquidity or on the firm￿s cost of capital. Moreover, Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000) presented evidence that share repurchase programs enhanced liquidity, rather than 
reducing it. 
The empirical evidence indicates that repurchase activity is motivated by several factors. 
Firms with more cash than they need for operation (excess cash) are more likely to repurchase 
their shares. Lower-growth firms are more likely to repurchase shares, because their investment 
￿opportunities shrink.  Researchers find evidence that both the announcement of repurchases and 
the actual repurchase activity is more pronounced at times when firms experience downward 
price pressure. There is no evidence that adverse selection in the market place is a reason for 
repurchases, nor is there any evidence that the market￿s underestimation of future cash flows or 
growth in earnings (or cash flows) are a motive in management￿s decision to repurchase. In fact, 
the evidence shows that repurchasing firms experience a reduction in operating performance, 
have excess cash, and invest less in the years after the repurchase announcement, and that their 
risk is significantly lower in the post-announcement years.  
It is also clear that the market does not incorporate the entire news contained in the 
repurchase announcement, be it about risk reduction, reduction in agency costs, or some other 
misvaluation.  The market underreaction is particularly pronounced for value stocks.  
 
9.4.3  Some empirical evidence on dividends compared to share repurchases  
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Equipped with the measures of actual repurchases that we discussed above, researchers 
were able to examine the issue of how dividend and repurchase policies interact.  It was also 
possible to consider whether firms view these methods as substitutes.  
Many of the theories discussed above have implications to whether repurchases and 
dividends are substitutes, or if they are used for different objectives altogether, which would 
indicate that there is no relation between dividends and repurchase policies. 
Theories that address the issue of total payout policy, such as Miller and Rock (1985) or 
Bhattacharya (1979), and which make no distinction between dividends and repurchases, imply 
that these two payout policies are perfect substitutes. Other theories, which rely on differential 
taxation, such as those by John and Williams (1985) and Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000), 
imply that these two payout policies are distinctly different and that there cannot be direct 
substitution between the two. 
The agency theories also imply substitution, but the substitution is not perfect. On the one 
hand, both repurchases and dividend payments take money out of management￿s hands and 
thereby reduce potential abuses. On the other hand, dividends act as a stronger commitment 
device, because management is more committed to maintaining a stable dividend policy than a 
stable repurchase policy (see Lintner, 1956). Thus, it is possible that management might 
distribute temporary excess cash through repurchases and more permanent excess cash through 
dividends. 
There is another reason why managers may have an incentive to pay fewer dividends and 
distribute more of the cash in the form of repurchases. This is the growing popularity of stock 
options, and especially of executive stock options. Stock options can affect the form of payment 
for at least two reasons. First, since these options are typically not protected against dividends,  
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managers (who own stock options) have an incentive to repurchase shares with the available cash 
rather than pay it out in the form of dividends. Second, many market analysts center their stock 
valuation on EPS numbers. Since the exercise of stock options dilutes EPS numbers, both the 
boards of directors and top management may decide to repurchase more shares to prevent 
dilution.
23  Thus, stock options can lead to the substitution of dividends for repurchases. 
We could argue that by definition, dividends and repurchases are perfect substitutes. A 
firm can either pay dividends or repurchase its shares. If, and only if, total payout is held 
constant is this statement correct. But we already know that all else is not constant. Firms can 
change the amount of cash kept in the firm, they can alter the amount of cash that goes to 
investments, and they can change the amount of cash that they raise from other sources, such as 
debt or equity.  
Therefore, another way to pose the question is to ask what has happened to total 
corporate payout since repurchases have become so popular.  Have dividends been reduced 
correspondingly so that total payout remains at a constant level? Or has total payout increased? 
Whether the increased popularity of repurchases increased corporate payout can be critically 
important to corporations, investors, and policy makers alike. The answer to this question has 
significant implications concerning corporate reinvestment rates, resource allocation, and the role 
of taxes in corporations￿ decisions. But despite its importance, only recently has the issue begun 
to receive attention from financial economists.  
                                                 
23 We do not to argue that this reason is rational (or irrational). It seems to be the case however, that this is a driving 
force behind many corporate financial decisions. For example, both authors of this chapter have heard on numerous 
occasions that one of the important yardsticks of mergers to be consummated is its impact on EPS. Managers are 
very reluctant to enter into a merger or an acquisition that dilutes EPS. Likewise, the impact of repurchases on EPS 
is also often mentioned. See also the discussion in Dunbar (2001) of how British institutional investors impose 
dilution constraints on management.  
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An analogous question has been recently debated in the public finance literature. The 
issue is the impact of 401k and IRA programs on U.S. saving rates, where 401k is the equivalent 
of repurchase programs and the total saving rates is analogous to total payout.  Has the 
introduction of these saving programs increased savings rates, or has it merely caused a shift 
from one saving vehicle to another? (See Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1996 for an excellent review 
of this issue.) 
In both cases (saving rates and payout rates), the key impediment to determining the 
impact of IRAs on saving and repurchases on payouts is agents￿ heterogeneity. Some 
corporations pay cash (mostly, the mature firms) and some corporations (those firms with growth 
opportunities) do not pay out cash to shareholders. Those that do pay tend to pay more in both 
forms. Thus, one of the main challenges for such an investigation is to control for this 
heterogeneity in various ways. 
In Table 1 and in Figure 1 we presented the pattern of dividends, repurchases, and total 
payout of U.S. industrial corporations through time relative to total corporate earnings and 
relative to the corporations￿ market value. The table shows that relative to total earnings, total 
payout has increased through time. It also shows that dividend payout did not decrease, despite 
the surge in repurchases. However, when we scale the cash payout by market value (Figure 1), 
the opposite picture emerges. Dividend yield has been going down through the years and 
repurchase yield has been going up. At least through the 1990s, there is no change in the total 
payout yield.  
However, the aggregate data may mask a qualitative difference across firms. For 
example, there could be some firms that never paid dividends and have recently started to pay  
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out cash in the form of repurchases. At the same time, firms that have been paying dividends 
might have continued to do so.  
To address the interaction between repurchase and dividend policy, Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) examined this relation at the individual-firm level as well. Their test relies on 
Lintner￿s (1956) analysis of how firms determine their dividend policy. Lintner observed that 
firms￿ dividend change decisions were a function of their targeted payout ratio and the speed of 
adjustment of current dividends to the target ratio. Using this model, Grullon and Michaely 
calculated the expected dividend payment for a firm based on its past dividend behavior, and 
determined whether actual dividend payments were above or below the expected dividend 
payment.   That way, they were able to observe whether a firm was deviating from its past 
dividend policy.  If the use of repurchases increased payout and did not affect dividend policy, 
then there would  not be any relation between the dividend forecast error from the Lintner model 
and repurchase activity. Grullon and Michaely defined the dividend-forecast error as:   
ERRORt,i = [∆ DIVt,i  - (β 1,i + β 2,i EARNt,i + β 3,iDIVt-1,i )]/MVt-1,i   
where ∆ DIVt,i is the actual change in dividends at time t, EARNt,i  is the earnings at time t, DIVt-
1,i is the dividend level at t-1, and MVt-1,i is the market value of equity at time t-1. The 
coefficients β 2,i and β 3,i are the parameters of earnings and lagged dividends from Lintner￿s 
(1956) model, respectively, that have been estimated over the pre-forecast period, 1972-1991.  
By scaling by the firm market value of equity, they were able to directly compare the forecast 
error to the repurchase and dividend yields.  
However, if repurchase activity reduces dividend payout, then the test should have result 
in a negative correlation between the dividend forecast error (actual minus expected) and share 
repurchase activity. In other words, finding a negative correlation between these two variables  
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would indicate that share repurchases have been partially financed with potential dividend 
increases.  
Their empirical evidence indicates that the dividend forecast error is negatively correlated 
with the share repurchase yield. The forecast error becomes more negative (monotonically) as 
the share repurchase yield increases. That is, as firms repurchase more, the actual dividend is 
lower than the expected dividend.  
They confirmed this result by a cross-sectional regression of the dividend forecast error 
on the repurchase yield, (controlling for size, the return on assets, the volatility of return on 
assets, and nonoperating income). The results indicate that the repurchase yield has a negative 
effect on the dividend forecast error even after controlling for firm characteristics.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that dividend-paying firms have been substituting 
dividends with share repurchases, but the rate of substitution is not one (i.e., they are not perfect 
substitutes).  This finding supports the idea that share-repurchase policy and dividend-policy are 
interrelated. 
But what types of firms use, and under which circumstances would managers decide to 
use, repurchases and/or dividends? We do not have yet the complete picture, but some recent 
research gives us some idea.  
The first issue is the relation between stock option programs and payout policy. Incentive 
compensation such as stock options could affect total payout if it aligns management incentive 
with those of shareholders, and therefore induces management not to invest in value-destroying 
projects and pay more to shareholders. Thus, incentive compensation may increase total payout. 
Additionally, as suggested before, managers with stock options, which are not dividend-
protected, will be motivated to shift the form of payout from dividends to repurchases.  
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Using a large sample of 1,100 nonfinancial firms during the period 1993-1997, Fenn and 
Liang (2000) reported a negative relation between stock option plans and dividends, a finding 
that supports the notion that the use of managerial incentive plans reduces managers￿ incentive to 
pay dividends. Moreover, their cross-sectional regression results indicated that (1) dividend 
payout was negatively related to the magnitude of stock option plans; (2) repurchase payout was 
positively related to the magnitude of stock option plans; and (3) total payout was negatively 
related to the magnitude of stock option plans. The reduction in total payout was larger than the 
increase in repurchases.  
Using a sample of 324 firms that announce a change in payout policy in 1993, Joll (1998) 
found a positive relation between the repurchase decision and the magnitude of the executive 
stock option plan.  
Weisbenner (2000) extended these studies.   He asked if the group holding the stock 
options (the firm￿s employees or management) made a difference on payout choice. A priori, we 
would expect it to do so. If mainly nonexecutive employees hold stock options, then the dividend 
protection is less of a factor (assuming management does not maximize employees￿ wealth). The 
dilution factor is still important, since it affects everyone who holds the stock, not just the 
employees. Thus, in the case of nonexecutive stock option plans we would expect an increase in 
repurchase activity but no reduction in dividends. If executives hold stock options, then we 
should expect both a reduction in dividends and an increase in repurchase activity.  
Weisbenner (2000) found empirical support for these hypotheses. The overall size of a 
firm￿s stock option program had a significant influence on the firm￿s repurchase policy 
(presumably in an attempt to prevent dilution). Stock option programs are also related to the 
firm￿s propensity to reduce retained earnings. Second, the larger the executives￿ holding of stock  
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options, the more likely the firm was to reduce dividends and to retain more of its earnings 
(presumably an outcome of managers￿ incentive not to pay dividends). 
The studies discussed above show an important link between compensation, and 
executive compensation in particular, and the form of payout. As the extent of stock option 
programs increase, firms tend to use more repurchases and to reduce retained earnings. When 
more of these stock option programs are directed towards top management, dividends also tend 
to be reduced. 
Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) found  another important link between 
firm￿s characteristics and payout policy. As with Lintner￿s model, the authors hypothesized that 
dividends were more of a permanent commitment than were share repurchases. Hence, dividends 
were more likely to be paid out of permanent earnings and repurchases were more likely to be 
used as a way to distribute temporary cash flows. The empirical implication of this hypothesis is 
that firms that experience higher cash flow variability tend to use repurchases while firms with 
lower cash flow variability tend to use dividends.  
Using a large sample of repurchase and dividend change events, Jagannathan, Stephens 
and Weisbach (2000) found that firms that repurchased their share had a higher variability of 
operating income relative to firms that only increased dividends, or to firms that increased their 
dividend and repurchased their shares. Not surprisingly, they found that firms that did  not pay 
cash had the highest cash flow variability of all. Using a Logit model, they showed that higher 
cash flow variability and higher nonoperating cash flow (two measures of temporary earnings) 
increased the likelihood of repurchases relative to dividends. As had earlier studies, they also 
found that although dividends appeared to be paid out of permanent earnings, there was no 
evidence of earnings improvements following dividend increases.   
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Lie￿s (2001) results also pointed in the same direction. He found that tender offers were 
more likely to occur when firms had excess cash on their balance sheet (a temporary build-up of 
cash), and dividends were more likely to increase with excess cash on the income statement 
(presumably a permanent increase in cash flow). 
Overall, the evidence indicates that at least in cross-sectional tests, firms that use stock 
options more intensely are more likely to use share repurchases. The evidence also associate 
firms that only repurchase with firms that are riskier (relative to those who pay dividends and 
those who do both). There is also some evidence that the increase in popularity of repurchases 
might be related to changes in regulation. The extent to which these variables can explain the 
dramatic increase in repurchases and the more moderate increase in overall payout is still an 
open question.  
 
9.5 Summary 
Open market repurchases have become a dominant form of payout. Given the economic 
climate and the deregulation of repurchasing shares around the world, we believe that the 
phenomenon is here to stay. Repurchases are likely to remain a dominant form of payout from 
corporations to their shareholders. As researchers, we do not yet have a clear grasp on how firms 
decide among the various forms of payouts, and in particular, how they decide on whether to pay 
cash in the form of dividends or share repurchases. Nor do we know how the decision affects 
their retained earnings and their investment decisions.  
The empirical evidence starts to give us some directions. It seems that young, risky firms 
prefer to use repurchases rather then dividends, though we do not fully understand what 
determines the choice. We observe that many large, established firms have substituted  
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repurchases for dividends. That is not to say that those firms have necessarily cut the nominal 
dividends, but they have increased dividends at a much lower rate than before. Instead, they have 
been paying more money to shareholders through repurchases. We see that those firms with 
more volatile earnings tend to substitute more often. But again, we do not have a firm 
understanding of what determines that choice. Finally, we ask how repurchases and payout 
policy as a whole interact with capital structure decisions (such as debt and equity issuance). We 
believe that these are very important questions and a promising field for further research. 
 
10.  Concluding Remarks 
There are a number of important empirical regularities concerning firms￿ payout policy.  
The first is that the mid-1980s represented a watershed.  Earlier, dividends constituted the vast 
majority of corporate payouts.  They grew at an average of about 15% per year.  Dividend yields 
over the long run remained fairly constant.  There were repurchases, but they represented only a 
small fraction of payouts.   
Since the mid 1980s, repurchases have become increasingly important.  Dividends have 
continued to increase in absolute terms, but at an average rate of 6% rather than 15% a year.  
Instead of increasing dividends, companies have been much more willing to increase the absolute 
payout by increasing repurchases.  Repurchases have grown steadily and are now about the same 
level of magnitude as dividends.  The result of these changes is that in the last decade or so, 
dividend yield has fallen significantly from 3% to 1.5%, but the yield resulting from the 
combination of dividends and repurchases has remained fairly constant at 3%.   
At the level of the individual firm there are a number of interesting regularities. Although 
dividends have decreased in relative importance and firms are much more willing to switch to  
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repurchases, dividends are still important in absolute terms.  Firms seem reluctant to cut 
dividends.  However, firms that have never paid dividends do not seem to regard them as a 
necessity.  Over the years, firms that initiate payments do so increasingly through repurchases.  
In the last five years, about 75% of initiating firms have used this method of payout. 
Another important aspect of the comparison between dividends and repurchases is that 
both have similar effects in terms of the sign of the impact.  Initiation of dividends, dividend 
increases, or repurchases are all taken as good news by the market. The difference is that 
repurchases are larger in size relative to dividend increases or initiations, and their impact on 
prices is more pronounced.  
Although these empirical regularities seem clear and provide a guide for how managers 
should behave, our understanding of why firms behave in this way is, to say the least, limited.  
This is the case despite the enormous effort that has been invested in the topic of payout policy 
over the years.   It is possible to tell a story, but it is by no means clear that it is anything more 
than a story. 
If we go back over a century or more, there seem to be obvious advantages to paying 
dividends.  Information was sparse and any firm that could consistently pay out dividends was 
signaling that it had long-term earning potential.  Firms that constantly repurchased and 
intervened in the market for their shares may well have been suspected of manipulating the stock 
price.  Moreover, for individuals to sell shares was an expensive business in terms of direct 
transaction costs.  Extensive insider trading and other similar abuses meant that, in terms of 
adverse selection, there was also a significant short-term cost from selling. This environment 
established a convention that paying dividends was good and cutting dividends was bad.    
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The change in the laws concerning repurchases and stock price manipulation in 1982 
meant that repurchases could be used without risk and made them an acceptable alternative.  
However, since cutting dividends is perceived as a bad signal, at least in the short run, firms are 
not willing to replace dividends with repurchases even though repurchases have tax advantages.  
However, as payout is increased, repurchases can be increasingly used.    
The other piece of the payout puzzle is that total payout yield in terms of dividends and 
repurchases has remained fairly constant at least for the last ten years.  One possible explanation 
for this is a signaling story.  The market treats increases in dividends and repurchases as good 
news. In theory, this reaction could be because increases are interpreted as signals of future 
operating performance.  However, there is evidence that increases in payout are not followed by 
improved operating performance, thus rejecting this explanation.  An alternative interpretation  is 
that the market is relieved that managers will no longer acquire cash that can be squandered, and 
this is why an increase in payout leads to a higher share price. 
Of course, all of this argument ignores many important factors, but it is an example of 
one explanation for the patterns that are observed in the data.  Much work remains to be done.  
So far, our discussion here has focused on dividends and repurchases.  But there is a third 
component of payout that has been largely ignored in the literature, and that is the cash payments 
for securities acquired in M&A transactions.  The precise amount paid out in this way is difficult 
to measure exactly.  However, the data we have gathered that does allow us to establish a lower 
bound suggests that over the last decade, such payments have been around $240b per year, or 
over 50% of aggregate payout if we also include dividends and repurchases. Measuring and 
understanding this component of payout policy is an important task for future research.  
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At this stage, we cannot recommend an optimal payout policy. However, we can make 
several general (and, admittedly, somewhat speculative) suggestions:  
1.  Following the example of the last decade, repurchases should be used much more 
frequently than they have been.  Investment and repurchase policies should be 
coordinated to avoid the transaction costs of financing.  When there are positive 
NPV investments, repurchases should be avoided.  In years where NPV 
investment opportunities are low, unneeded cash should be paid out by 
repurchasing shares. 
2.  To the greatest extent possible, firms that have a high degree of information 
asymmetry and large growth opportunities should avoid paying dividends.  The 
significant costs associated with raising equity capital for these firms makes 
payment of dividends even more costly.  Stated differently, in periods when a 
firm faces many good investment opportunities, a dividend reduction might  not 
be such a bad idea. 
3.  Given the restrictive dividend-related covenants and the fact that firms interact 
with bondholders more than once, the use of dividends to extract wealth from 
debtholders should be avoided.  Most times, it does not work.  Even when it does, 
the long-run result can be detrimental to equityholders. (There is no evidence that 
management follow this strategy in practice) 
4.    We cannot think of a good reason why most U.S. firms pay dividends on a 
quarterly basis instead of on an annual basis.  Longer intervals between payments 
would allow investors that are interested in long-term capital gains to sell the 
stock before the ex-day, avoid paying tax on the dividend, and maintain the long- 
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term tax status of the stock.  Such a schedule would also allow corporations who 
might be interested in dividend income to minimize transaction costs and 
deviation from optimal asset allocation while capturing the dividend.  Finally, it 
would save the dividend-paying corporation administrative and mailing costs 
associated with dividend payments. 
5.  Avoid costly ￿signals.￿  Hopefully, the firm is going to stay alive for a long time.  
Managers can find cheaper and more persuasive ways to credibly convey the 
company￿s true worth to the market. 
6.  The difference in taxes between dividends and capital gains makes high-yield 
stocks less attractive to individual investors in high tax brackets.  Such investors 
should try to hold an otherwise identical portfolio with low-yield stocks. 
Other people might disagree with these suggestions.  However, until our understanding of 
the subject is improved, they represent a logical way for managers and investors to proceed.  
Much more empirical and theoretical research on the subject of payout is required before a 
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Table 1: Aggregate Cash Distributions to Equityholders 
 
Aggregate cash ￿distributions to equityholders for a sample of U.S. firms, by year.  The data sample consists of all firms on Compustat over the period 1972-
1998 that have available information on the variables REPO, DIV, EARN, and MV.  REPO is the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks 
(Compustat item # 115) minus any reduction in the value (redemption value) of the net number of preferred shares outstanding (Compustat item # 56). DIV is the 
total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock (Compustat item #21). EARN is the earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18).  
MV is the market value of common stock (Compustat item #24 times Compustat item # 25).  TP is the average total payout (dividends plus earnings) across 
firms for a given year. The data sample contains 121,973 firm-year observations and excludes banks, utilities, and insurance companies. 
 
Year Number EARN MV TP DIV REPO TP/EARN DIV/EARN REPO/EARN TP/MV DIV/MV REPO/MV 
                 
1972  2802 41437  803582 19122 17633  1488 46.1%  42.6%  3.6%  2.4%  2.2%  0.2% 
1973  3107 57503  673974 23517 20470  3047 40.9%  35.6%  5.3%  3.5%  3.0%  0.5% 
1974  3411 70139  500180 27508 25961  1547 39.2%  37.0%  2.2%  5.5%  5.2%  0.3% 
1975  3573 65856  690795 28196 27389  807 42.8%  41.6%  1.2%  4.1%  4.0%  0.1% 
1976  3600 84318  865569 33496 31917  1579 39.7%  37.9%  1.9%  3.9%  3.7%  0.2% 
1977  3615 95147  825171 41768 38202  3566 43.9%  40.2%  3.7%  5.1%  4.6%  0.4% 
1978  3536 106352 836025  44449  40193  4256  41.8%  37.8%  4.0%  5.3%  4.8%  0.5% 
1979  3581 134988 999286  51525  46104  5421  38.2%  34.2%  4.0%  5.2%  4.6%  0.5% 
1980  3868  136159  1306814 55978 50289  5689 41.1%  36.9%  4.2%  4.3%  3.8%  0.4% 
1981  3972  132796  1143197 58064 51802  6262 43.7%  39.0%  4.7%  5.1%  4.5%  0.5% 
1982  4574  103817  1313398 62294 52701  9593 60.0%  50.8%  9.2%  4.7%  4.0%  0.7% 
1983  4461  130188  1648433 68282 59384  8899 52.4%  45.6%  6.8%  4.1%  3.6%  0.5% 
1984  4686  151671  1554682 89327 61356 27971 58.9%  40.5%  18.4%  5.7%  3.9%  1.8% 
1985  4721 141464  2082677 104606  71471  33136  73.9%  50.5%  23.4%  5.0%  3.4%  1.6% 
1986  4719 133656  2436697 110569  74862  35707  82.7%  56.0%  26.7%  4.5%  3.1%  1.5% 
1987  4908 185146  2581264 137014  84973  52041  74.0%  45.9%  28.1%  5.3%  3.3%  2.0% 
1988  4895 220034  2878728 144980  96216  48765  65.9%  43.7%  22.2%  5.0%  3.3%  1.7% 
1989  4804 227613  3610378 162795 107846  54949  71.5%  47.4%  24.1%  4.5%  3.0%  1.5% 
1990  4781 213056  3331772 160245 113971  46275  75.2%  53.5%  21.7%  4.8%  3.4%  1.4% 
1991  4780 168668  4255871 138124 115162  22962  81.9%  68.3%  13.6%  3.2%  2.7%  0.5% 
1992  4934 171373  4385812 144268 110978  33289  84.2%  64.8%  19.4%  3.3%  2.5%  0.8% 
1993  5120 209238  5155047 153834 117499  36334  73.5%  56.2%  17.4%  3.0%  2.3%  0.7% 
1994  5588 303578  5548638 183147 136645  46503  60.3%  45.0%  15.3%  3.3%  2.5%  0.8% 
1995  5860 354987  7373933 221218 148889  72330  62.3%  41.9%  20.4%  3.0%  2.0%  1.0% 
1996  6289 433290  9077805 276917 175109 101808  63.9%  40.4%  23.5%  3.1%  1.9%  1.1% 
1997  6293 448572  11479240 321619 177777 143842  71.7%  39.6%  32.1%  2.8%  1.5%  1.3% 
1998  5174 362827  11785621 349555 174067 175488  96.3%  48.0%  48.4%  3.0%  1.5%  1.5% 
 
Source: Based on Table 1 of Grullon and Michaely (2002), ￿Dividends, share repurchases and the substitution hypothesis.￿   133 
Figure 1 
Cash Distributions to Equityholders as a Percentage of Market Value  
 
This figure depicts the average total payout (dividends plus repurchases) yield, the average dividend yield, and the 
average repurchase yield (all relative to market value) for a sample of U.S. firms. The data sample consists of all 
firm-year observations on Compustat (Full-Coverage, Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, Research, and Back Files) over 
the period 1972-1998 that have positive earnings and have available information on the  variables REPO, DIV,  and 
MV.  REPO is the expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks (Compustat item # 115) minus any 
reduction in the value (redemption value) of the net number of preferred shares outstanding (Compustat item # 56). 
DIV is the total dollar amount of dividends declared on the common stock (Compustat item #21). MV is the market 
value of common stock (Compustat item #24 times Compustat item # 25).  The total payout is the sum of the 
dividend payout and the repurchase payout.  The data sample contains 121,973 firm-year observations and excludes 
banks, utilities, and insurance companies. 
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Source: Figure 2 from Fama and French (2001), ￿Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm 
Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?￿ 




---■--- Proportion of firms that payout only with dividends  
---▲--- Proportion of firms that payout with dividends and repurchases  
---• -- Proportion of firms that payout only with repurchases  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of firms by payout method. This figure depicts the distribution of firms by 
payout method for a sample of U.S. firms.  We determine the payout policy of a firm by observing the cash 
disbursements of the firm over a period of a year.  The data sample consists of all firm-year observations on 
Compustat (Full-Coverage, Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, Research, and Back Files) over the period 1972-2000 that 
have available information on the following variables: REPO, DIV, EARN, and MV.  REPO is the expenditure on 
the purchase of common and preferred stocks (Compustat item #115) minus any reduction in the value (redemption 
value) of the net number of preferred shares outstanding (Compustat item # 56). DIV is the total dollar amount of 
dividends declared on the common stock (Compustat item #21). EARN is the earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat item #18).  MV is the market value of common stock (Compustat item #24 times Compustat item #25). 
The data sample contains 136,646 firm-year observations and excludes banks, utilities, and insurance companies. 
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Share of corporate equity 
owned by individuals
 
Total dividends paid 
by US corporations 








(% of total div) 
Dividends received by 
individual with an adjusted 
gross income of over 
50,000 relative to dividend 








































































0.592 106.3  15.1  61.6 
(58%) 
61% 
 0.578  112.2  13.8  66.8  57%   137 
1987  (59%) 
 
1988 















































0.513 333.7  NA  NA  NA 
 
1998 
0.485 348.6  NA  NA  NA 
 
1999 
0.495 364.7  NA  NA  NA 
Authors￿ calculation with data on market value of domestic corporations and the holding (at market value) of households, personal trust and estates. Source Table 
L.213 from the Federal Reserve statistical release, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, March 2000. 
b. From the Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table f.7, March 2000. 
c. We include only dividends received from domestic corporations. Internal Revenue Service, SOI Bulletin, Corporations return, Table 2, various years 
d Internal Revenue Service, SOI Bulletin, Individuals Tax Returns, Table 1.4, various years. 
e. Internal Revenue Service, SOI Bulletin, Individuals Tax Returns, Table 1.4, various years   138 
 Table  3 
 
  Comparative Annual Dividend Changes 1971-1993 
  (Based on data from approximately 13,200 publicly held issues) 
 
  Type of Dividend Change 
Year Increase  Decrease  Resume  Omit 
1971 794  155  106  215 
1972 1,301  96  124  111 
1973 2,292  55  154  95 
1974 2,529  100  162  225 
1975 1,713  215  116  297 
1976 2,672  78  133  153 
1977 3,090  92  135  168 
1978 3,354  65  127  144 
1979 3,054  70  85  115 
1980 2,483  127  82  122 
1981 2,513  136  82  226 
1982 1,805  322  97  319 
1983 1807  68  57  109 
1984 1562  71  32  138 
1985 1497  95  46  198 
1986 1587  71  54  107 
1987 1702  65  40  117 
1988 1683  80  42  152 
1989 1312  137  39  255 
1990 1072  188  48  264 
1991 1314  139  55  145 
1992 1333  131  53  146 
1993 1635  87  75  106 
1994 1826  59  52  77 
1995 1882  49  51  73 
1996 2171  50  37  80 
1997 2139  46  24  49 
1998 2047  84  17  61 
1999 1701  62  38  83 
2000 1438  69  32  75 
2001 1244  117  17  70 
Source:  For data until 1982:  Moody￿s Dividend Record. For data between 1983 and 2001: S&P dividend record.   139 
 
 Table  4 











(where US firms 










Net payout from M&A 
and raising capital 
(2)-(3)-(4) 
1977 191.8  191.8  221  382  -412 
1978 8882  8086  225  305  7556 
1979 7993  7589  398  247  6944 
1980 17570  10417  1387  10901  -1871 
1981 86098  59725  3114  10958  45653 
1982 53426  27080  1339  14743  10998 
1983 82757  30539  12460  26071  -7992 
1984 151709  94029  3868  6032  84129 
1985 169156  151999  8477  16493  127029 
1986 193620  167028  22251  20430  124347 
1987 185730  158662  23982  16613  118067 
1988 310895  289377  23806  5941  259630 
1989 235759  194966  13706  9332  171928 
1990 143402  109427  10122  8998  90307 
1991 106659  66778  25138  33749  7890 
1992 130264  75957  39620  31866  4471 
1993 203545  113186  57423  48995  6768 
1994 307047  183956  33728  27487  122741 
1995 462829  228104  30207  54176  143721 
1996 544484  306812  50000  71222  185590 
1997 819663  390359  44226  75409  270724 
1998 1392997  410619  43721  70886  296012 
1999 1021026  543324  71327  100048  371949 
Source: Thompson Financial Securities Data.   140 
Table 5: Net total payout to individual investors 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Year  Portion held by 
individuals (from 
Table 2) 
Net payout from 
M&A and raising 
capital (from 
Table 4) 












(from table 2) 





                 
1977 0.718  -412  -296 3566  2560  27800  30065 
1978 0.696  7556  5259 4256  2962  30200  38421 
1979 0.708  6944  4916 5421  3838  33500  42254 
1980 0.71  -1871  -1328 5689  4039  43600  46311 
1981 0.69  45653  31501 6262  4321  48100  83921 
1982 0.653  10998  7182 9593  6264  52100  65546 
1983 0.624  -7992  -4987 8899  5553  48600  49166 
1984 0.6  84129  50477 27971  16783  48600  115860 
1985 0.572  127029  72661 33136  18954  55000  146614 
1986 0.592  124347  73613 35707  21139  61600  156352 
1987 0.578  118067  68243 52041  30080  66800  165122 
1988 0.617  259630  160192 48765  30088  77300  267580 
1989 0.612  171928  105220 54949  33629  81300  220149 
1990 0.617  90307  55719 46275  28552  80200  164471 
1991 0.63  7890  4971 22962  14466  77300  96737 
1992 0.62  4471  2772 33289  20639  77900  101311 
1993 0.611  6768  4135 36334  22200  79700  106035 
1994 0.585  122741  71803 46503  27204  82400  181408 
1995 0.579  143721  83214 72330  41879  94600  219694 
1996 0.543  185590  100775 101808  55282  104200  260257 
1997 0.513  270724  138881 143842  73791  NA  NA 
1998 0.485  296012  143566 175488  85112  NA  NA 
1999 0.495  371949  184115 202000  99990  NA  NA 
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Table 6 
A Clientele Model Example 
 
 
High dividend   Medium dividend Low  dividend 
     Payout            payout         payout 
     
 




Dividends                                      $100                $ 50           $  0 





(i)  Individuals                        $ 50                $ 65            $ 80 
(ii)  Corporations                        $ 90                $ 77.5            $ 65 
(iii)  Institutions                        $100                $100            $100 
 
Equilibrium price/share                      $1000                 $1000           $1000 
 









Asset Holdings in the Clientele Model Example 
 
 
Group     Asset  holdings 
 
High tax bracket    Low-dividend-payout assets 
 
Corporations    High-dividend-payout  assets 
 
Tax-free institutions    Any assets 
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Table 8 
Ex-Dividend Day Premiums 
 
This table presents the average premiums (price drop relative to dividend paid) for three time periods.  The first 
period, 1966 and 1967, is in Elton and Gruber (1970) and Kalay (1982); the second, third, and forth periods, 1986, 
1987, and 1988, are the periods before the implementation of the 1986 TRA, the transition year, and after the 
implementation of the 1986 TRA, respectively.  We adjust premiums to the overall market movements using the 
OLS market model. Premiums are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Results are taken from Michaely (1991) 
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Table 9 
Firm Characteristics of Dividend-Changing Firms 
 
This table reports the firm characteristics for sample of firms that change their cash dividends over the period 1967-
1993. To be included in the sample, the observation must satisfy the following criteria: 1) the firm￿s financial data is 
available on CRSP and Compustat; 2) the cash dividend announcement is not accompanied by other non-dividend 
events; 3) only quarterly cash dividends are considered; 4) cash dividend changes that are less than 10% or greater 
than 500% are excluded; 5) cash dividend initiations and omissions are excluded; 6) the last cash dividend payment 
is paid within 90 days prior to the announcement of the cash dividend change.  CHGDIV is the percentage change in 
the cash dividend payment, CAR is the three-day cumulative NYSE/Amex value-weighted abnormal return around 
the dividend announcement, SIZE is the market value of equity at the time of the announcement of the cash dividend 
change, RSIZE is the size decile ranking relative to the entire sample of firms on CRSP, PRICE is the average price, 
and DY is the dividend yield at the time of the announcement of the cash dividend change.  
 
Dividend Increases (6,284 obs.) 
 Mean Std. Median 
CHGDIV 
% 
30.1 29.3 22.2 
CAR  %  1.34 4.33 0.95 
SIZE 1,185.1  3,796.1  195.9 
RSIZE 8.1  2.1  9 
PRICE  29.60 24.23 24.50 
DY  %  3.74 2.09 3.46 
 
Dividend Decreases (1358 obs.) 
 Mean Std. Median 
CHGDIV 
% 
-44.8 16.4  -45.9 
CAR %  -3.71  6.89  -2.05 
SIZE 757.4  2,489.4  148.0 
RSIZE 7.7  2.4  8 
PRICE  26.31 25.31 18.50 
DY  %  3.29 2.19 2.87 
 
Source: Table 1, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002), ￿Are Dividend Changes a Sign of Firm Maturity?￿   145 
Table 10 
Regressions of Raw Earnings Changes on Dividend Changes Using  
the  Fama and French Approach to Predict Expected Earnings 
 
This table reports estimates of regressions relating raw earnings changes to dividend changes. 
Eτ is the earnings before extraordinary items in year τ  (year 0 is the event year).  B-1 is the book 
value of equity at the end of year ￿1.  RD I V ∆ is the annual percentage change in the cash dividend 
payment.  ROEτ is equal to the earnings before extraordinary items in year τ  scaled by the book 
value of equity at the end of year τ . DFE0 is equal to  ROE0- E[ ROE0], where E[ ROE0] is the 
fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of  ROE0 on the log of total assets in year ￿1, the 
market-to-book ratio of equity in year ￿1, and  ROE− 1. CE0 is equal to (- ) EE/ B -1 01 − . NDFED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is negative and 0 otherwise.  PDFED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if DFE0 is positive and 0 otherwise. NCED0 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is negative and 0 otherwise.  PCED0 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if CE0 is positive and 0 otherwise.  We use the Fama-MacBeth 
procedure to estimate the regression coefficients.  In the first stage, we estimate cross-sectional 
regression coefficients each year using all the observations in that year. In the second-stage, we 
compute time-series means and t-statistics of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The t-
statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation in the slope coefficients and reported in parentheses.  a, 
b, and c denote significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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            Year  β 1  Adjusted-R
2 
   τ = 1     Mean  0.005 22.5% 
                 T-statistic  0.56   
                 % of t(β i ) > 1.65  11.8%  
    
    τ = 2    Mean  0.011 9.7% 
                 T-statistic  1.13   
                 % of t(β i ) > 1.65  12.1%  
 
Source: Table 2, Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely, and Thaler (2002), ￿Changes in Dividends (Still) Signal the Past￿ 
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Figure 4 
Level of Return of Assets 
 
This figure depicts the level of return on assets (ROA) based on operating income before depreciation 
(Compustat annual item #13) for a sample of firms that change their dividends over the period 1967-1993.  
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Table 11 
This table reports the average stock price before and after the dividend increase 
announcement, the change in the firm cost of capital (using the Fama-French three factor 
model), the change in the average dividend payment, and the implied change in growth. 
The implied change in growth is imputed from the Gordon growth model. 
 







$29.6  $30   We calculate the price of $30 
based on an average market 
reaction of 1.43%) 
Discount rates  13.2%  12.2%  We calculate the discount rate 
based on Fama-French 3 
factors models and a riskless 
rate of 5 
Average 
dividend 
$1.1 (table 1)  $1.4  The average increase in 
dividend is 30%, (Table 1) 
Implied growth 
rate 
9.48% 7.48%  
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Table 12 
The Use of Dutch Auctions, Tender Offers and Open Market Share Repurchases 
Through time. 
 







      Dollars 
(millions) 
    
Cases 
     Dollars 
(millions) 
1980  -             -    1980  1                5    1980            86           1,429 
1981  -             -    1981  44          1,329    1981            95           3,013 
1982  -             -    1982  40          1,164    1982           129           3,112 
1983  -             -    1983  40          1,352    1983            53           2,278 
1984  1              9    1984  67        10,517    1984           236          14,910 
1985  6        1,123    1985  36        13,352    1985           159          22,786 
1986  11        2,332    1986  20          5,492    1986           219          28,417 
1987  9        1,502    1987  42          4,764    1987*           132          34,787 
1988  21        7,695    1988  32          3,826    1988           276          33,150 
1989  22        5,044    1989  49          1,939    1989           499          62,873 
1990  10        1,933    1990  41          3,463    1990           778          39,733 
1991  4           739    1991  51          4,715    1991           282          16,139 
1992  7        1,638    1992  37          1,488    1992           447          32,635 
1993  5        1,291    1993  51          1,094    1993           461          35,000 
1994  10           925    1994  52          2,796    1994           824          71,036 
1995  8           969    1995  40            542    1995           851          81,591 
1996  22        2,774    1996  37          2,562    1996        1,111        157,917 
1997  30        5,442    1997  35          2,552    1997           967        163,688 
1998  20        2,640    1998  13          4,364    1998        1,537        215,012 
1999  19        3,817    1999  21          1,790    1999        1,212        137,015 
Source: Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000, ￿What do we know about stock repurchase?￿ 
 